China’s decision to reduce or remove some retaliatory tariffs has encouraged a cautious optimism among British businesses. Yet while the trade climate appears to be improving, brands entering or re-entering the Chinese market are faced with the more complex challenge of navigating a complex consumer ecosystem shaped by policy shifts, cultural expectations and rising nationalism.

The reality is that while some trade barriers have lowered, others, especially those linked to regulation, culture and politics, remain significant.

Regulatory headwinds

China’s business environment has become more tightly governed in recent years. Foreign firms must now comply with a range of new requirements, from data privacy and security laws to investment restrictions and evolving digital content regulations.

Entire industries have undergone sweeping regulatory changes. From livestream ecommerce to education, the rules are continually being rewritten—often at short notice and with opaque enforcement. Understanding these changes is critical for British brands seeking market entry or expansion.

“In an unstable environment, I believe in a ‘Ready, fire, aim’ approach. Move quickly, test early, then refine your strategy. Those who wait for certainty may miss the window,” says Yang Ding, Founder and Director of New Silk Route Digital.

New Silk Route supports British brands across sectors such as sport, education and culture. Their work involves localising campaigns for Chinese audiences through livestreaming, influencer partnerships and culturally attuned storytelling. “It’s not just about exporting products,” Yang adds. “It’s about exporting values, and doing so in a way that resonates locally.”

Cultural literacy and soft power

British culture retains a powerful pull for many Chinese consumers. From the Premier League to Harry Potter, the UK continues to enjoy strong cultural cachet. But audiences today demand more than surface-level branding. They want relevance, authenticity and an understanding of what truly matters to them.

This was evident in the years leading up to the pandemic, when tourism was a central pillar of UK–China engagement. Public-private collaboration enabled large-scale, coordinated efforts to attract Chinese visitors to Britain’s regions.

“Before the pandemic, when China was a key visitor market and the UK government was investing heavily to keep Britain competitive, we had the opportunity to work with some of Britain’s most popular tourism destinations,” says Meimei Zhao, Founder of Variety Plus. “One standout project was in collaboration with London & Partners, where we supported the development and launch of tourism products designed specifically for the Chinese market — connecting London and Manchester with surrounding regions.”

Variety Plus helps UK and European brands expand into China, and Chinese brands go global. Zhao credits the success of these campaigns to the Discover England Fund — a £40 million government initiative that united airlines, hotels, attractions, and metro mayors around a shared vision. “It was a strong example of what’s possible when public and private sectors align,” she says. “Sadly, in the absence of sustained, large-scale funding for multi-year programmes, initiatives of this scale have become much harder to deliver.”

Despite this, British institutions and brands continue to foster cultural links through partnerships, creative collaborations and targeted campaigns — especially in education, design, heritage and lifestyle.

Shifting consumer dynamics

Today’s Chinese consumers are more value-driven, digitally fluent and locally proud. While international brands are still welcomed, especially in sectors like skincare, nutrition and premium fashion, they face stiff competition from high-quality domestic players.

British brands must bring more than heritage. They need relevance and adaptability, especially online. Digital ecosystems such as WeChat, Xiaohongshu and Douyin dominate daily life. Brands that localise their presence within these platforms are best placed to build lasting engagement.

Live commerce and influencer-led marketing are no longer optional, they’re central to the brand discovery journey. But execution matters. Chinese consumers are sensitive to tone, aesthetics and messaging. A misstep can be costly, while a well-executed campaign can deliver exponential returns. “Influencers in China are not just marketers,” says Yang Ding. “They’re cultural translators. The right partnership can open doors that advertising alone never will.”

Some of the most successful British brands in China today are those that combine product excellence with credible storytelling. This often involves deeper collaborations with local communities, creators and cultural tastemakers.

Political context and risk

While trade relations may be warming in some areas, wider UK–China relations remain complex. Issues such as technology, national security and academic exchange continue to shape the bilateral relationship. And for brands, politics cannot be ignored.

Chinese consumers are increasingly attuned to perceived slights, whether real or manufactured. Misjudged campaigns, poorly timed statements or partnerships with controversial figures can quickly spark backlash. State media and social platforms can amplify reputational risk within hours.

As a result, many brands are treading carefully. Some are pivoting to lower-risk sectors, such as health and wellbeing, education technology or sustainability. Others are investing more in market intelligence and crisis planning.

Still, there are windows of opportunity. Regional governments in China remain enthusiastic about foreign investment, particularly when it brings innovation, jobs or exports. British firms with a clear offer and flexible delivery models can still gain traction—if they act decisively. “We are in an era where agility beats certainty,” says Yang Ding. “It’s no longer about finding the ‘perfect’ strategy. It’s about learning fast, acting local, and building real human connections. That’s how you build brand equity in China today.”

Join CBBC’s China Consumer 2025 to learn more about the consumer and retail sector in China

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As 2025 approaches, analysts are closely watching for signals on how China plans to navigate its domestic challenges and global ambitions. Here’s a breakdown of what to expect from China’s Two Sessions in 2025.

For a thorough post-event analysis and interactive Q&A session featuring a panel of industry experts, we recommend CBBC’s upcoming “Two Sessions Debrief” on 13 March 2025. Experts including Su Yue, Principal Economist at the Economist Intelligence Unit, and Feng Chucheng, Partner, Hutong Research, will discuss the outcomes from this year’s Two Sessions and provide analysis on the political and economic implications for UK business. Sign up here.

What are the Two Sessions?

The Two Sessions are a key platform for China’s political decision-making. The NPC, China’s top legislative body, reviews and approves major policies, the national budget, and government reports, including the Premier’s work report. The CPPCC, an advisory body, gathers representatives from various sectors to provide recommendations on policy issues. Together, these meetings offer a comprehensive roadmap for China’s governance and strategic priorities.

In recent years, the Two Sessions have focused on economic recovery, technological self-reliance, environmental sustainability, and social welfare. Against a backdrop of global uncertainty and domestic pressures, the 2025 meetings are expected to address these themes while reinforcing China’s long-term goals.

Economic stability and growth

Economic policy will take centre stage at the 2025 Two Sessions. China’s leadership is likely to prioritise measures to stabilise growth and boost consumer confidence. In 2024, China set a GDP growth target of around 5% and it is likely that this will be maintained in 2025.

To achieve this growth, China is expected to implement a more proactive fiscal policy. For example, the fiscal deficit ratio may be increased to approximately 4% of GDP, surpassing the traditional 3% threshold. This move would allow for greater government spending on infrastructure projects, social welfare programs, and initiatives aimed at stimulating domestic consumption.

Other analysts have pointed out that China’s property market, which has been a significant drag on economic growth, will be a focal point. The government may introduce further measures to stabilise the sector, including support for affordable housing and reforms to address local government debt.

Technological innovation and self-reliance

Technological self-reliance will be another major theme.

The emergence of Chinese AI company DeepSeek has garnered substantial attention in recent months. DeepSeek’s recent achievements have positioned it as a formidable opponent to Western tech giants like competitor OpenAI, highlighting China’s growing prowess in the tech sector.

Nevertheless, China continues to face challenges in achieving self-sufficiency in semiconductors and other critical technologies. The 2025 Two Sessions may unveil new policies to support research and development, as well as incentives for domestic companies to reduce reliance on foreign technology.

Green transition and climate goals

China’s commitment to achieving carbon neutrality by 2060 will remain a key focus. According to The Guardian, the 2025 Two Sessions are expected to outline plans for expanding renewable energy projects, including wind, solar, and nuclear power. The government may also introduce policies to promote energy efficiency and reduce emissions in heavy industries.

Others suggest that China’s carbon trading market is set to play a larger role in achieving climate goals. The 2025 meetings may include announcements on enhancing the market’s scope and encouraging green finance initiatives to support the transition to a low-carbon economy.

Demographic challenges

China’s ageing population and declining birth rate pose challenges to the country’s long-term economic stability, and policymakers are likely to propose reforms to try to slow their effects. For example, a member of the CPPCC has recently proposed lowering the legal marriage age from 22 to 18 for men, and from 20 to 18 for women, to encourage earlier family formation.

Additionally, the government may introduce incentives for families, including financial subsidies, tax breaks and enhanced access to childcare services. These measures aim to alleviate the financial burdens associated with raising children and to promote a more family-friendly environment.​

Geopolitical considerations

The Two Sessions will also provide insights into China’s approach to international relations. Amid the constantly-evolving situation of the war in Ukraine, and with tensions persisting between China and the West, particularly over trade, the 2025 meetings may highlight efforts to strengthen ties with emerging markets and regional partners.

As such, Chinese state media have reported that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) will remain a cornerstone of the country’s foreign policy. The 2025 Two Sessions may announce new infrastructure projects and partnerships, as well as reiterate China’s commitment to multilateralism and global governance.

Predictions for 2025

The 2025 Two Sessions will need to achieve a balancing act between addressing immediate challenges and advancing long-term goals. Key themes will include economic stability, technological innovation, environmental sustainability, and social welfare.

While the meetings are largely scripted, they offer valuable insights into the priorities of China’s leadership. As the country navigates a complex domestic and international landscape, the decisions made at the 2025 Two Sessions will have far-reaching implications for China and the world.

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Although Trump’s re-election will be felt globally, few countries are likely to be affected quite like China. Trump is a champion of isolationism and the architect of the US-China Trade War and sweeping tariffs on Chinese goods. China was a focal point in his recent campaign, where he pledged a blanket 60% tariff on Chinese imports. Yet Trump is known to embellish, and his promised iron-fist approach to China may not unfold exactly as people expect.

To start, a 60% tariff would not bode well for the middle Americans who voted for him, hoping for a return to the pre-outsourcing-to-China days – not during his presidential term, anyway. During the last tariff hike, businesses quickly realised how complex, fragmented, and China-dependent supply chains had become.

Reshoring manufacturing from China to the US is not straightforward. Most manufactured goods require numerous components, many of which are made in China and thus still exposed to these tariffs. This became evident with the last set of tariffs. Given the reliance on China for so many goods and components, the biggest impact of new tariffs would be higher prices and inflation in the US – one of the main pain points for the Biden administration and a primary driver of change.

In the longer term, some businesses may look to diversify to other manufacturing locations. However, the challenges of shifting supply chains out of China, coupled with China’s unique advantages as a manufacturing powerhouse, mean that China is likely to remain the world’s factory during Trump’s second term and beyond.

Despite gloomy predictions after Trump’s first round of tariffs, China’s global share of exports has risen by 1.5% since before Trump’s first presidency – over three times the growth rate of the next highest region, Latin America, according to the IMF.

Another card China holds in its relationship with a Trump-led America is Elon Musk. Musk has donated more than $118 million to support Trump’s 2024 campaign, heavily supported him on X, and has been named government efficiency tsar, even accompanying Trump on his post-election call with Ukrainian President Zelensky. While Musk can be as unpredictable as Trump, he has significant exposure to China, with over half of all Teslas manufactured at its Shanghai factory. Musk has often expressed respect for the Chinese people and their innovations, and has supported some of their policy directions that are unpopular in the West. Trump also has close ties with Apple, Blackstone and other companies with significant interests in China.

Regardless of how much inflationary concerns, the role of Elon Musk or other business interests temper Trump’s policies toward China, Beijing is likely to double down on efforts to reduce its reliance on US exports. We can expect to see a stronger focus on driving domestic consumption in China, aiming to increase its contribution beyond the 49.9% of GDP growth seen in the first three quarters of this year – a promising sign for brands targeting Chinese consumers.

While a Trump-led America may fuel nationalism in China, Beijing could take a similar approach to Trump’s last presidency. If Trump once again adopts an “America-First” isolationist stance, Xi might reiterate to the global community that China is open and welcoming, not isolating. Encouraging Russia to end its war could be a strategic move to regain some favour with Europe.

With Beijing supporting an open world, countries like the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Europe, and potentially Canada may benefit from positive brand exposure, along with an influx of students and tourists who would have traditionally chosen the US, reaping the associated halo effect.

China won’t be without challenges under a Trump presidency – neither will the rest of the world. Geopolitical tensions will persist, yet it may not spell the doomsday for China that some predict.

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Prior to leaving for China on what is only the second such trip by a top UK minister in six years, Mr Lammy said that “engagement with China is pragmatic and necessary to support UK and global interests…we must speak often and candidly across both areas of contention as well as areas for cooperation in the UK’s national interest”.

Mr Lammy’s visit began with meetings with Chinese Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang (the most senior of China’s vice premiers) and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on Friday, 18 October.  

In his meeting with Mr Lammy, the vice premier referred to the recent phone call between President Xi and Prime Minister Starmer, during which they reached an important consensus on strengthening cooperation and exchanges across various fields, providing clear direction for the development of bilateral relations. Mr Ding said: “China is willing to work with the UK, with a strategic and long-term perspective, to build a stable and mutually beneficial relationship. By upgrading practical cooperation across all sectors, both countries and their peoples will benefit, and greater momentum will be injected into global peace and prosperity.”

In his meeting with Mr Lammy, Chinese Foreign Minister Mr Wang said that “China-Britain relations… now stand at a new starting point” and stressed that competition among major powers should not be the backdrop of this era.

The Foreign Secretary mentioned scope for “mutually beneficial cooperation” in areas such as climate, energy, science, trade and tech, while cautioning that Britain would “always put its national interests and national security first”.

On Saturday 19 October, Tom Simpson, Managing Director, China, CBBC, co-chaired a business roundtable in Shanghai with the Foreign Secretary.

The roundtable provided an opportunity for Mr Lammy to hear the views of British businesses from across a diverse range of sectors, including finance, healthcare, consumer, automotive, education, and energy.

During the roundtable, Mr Lammy highlighted the new government’s approach to establishing stable and consistent engagement with China. Lammy also reflected on the role British business will play in supporting the UK government’s economic growth mission and net zero ambitions.

On behalf of CBBC and our members, Tom Simpson provided insights into the challenges and opportunities facing British business in China, while highlighting the importance of attracting Chinese investment to the UK.

“As I said in my comments to the Foreign Secretary, his visit to China is a real boost for the morale of the British business community,” Simpson commented. “We are encouraged by the new government’s approach and the prospect of sensible and hopefully sustained engagement with China. British business needs the backing of our government more than ever to ensure our companies can continue to succeed in China, and channel the economic benefits back to the UK”.

Following the roundtable with British business, the Foreign Secretary met with Shanghai Mayor Gong Zheng before attending a reception at the Museum of Art Pudong organised by the British Council and the Shanghai British Consulate. The reception was attended by around 200 representatives from business, education, arts and culture. 

Commenting on Mr Lammy’s China visit, CBBC Chief Executive Peter Burnett emphasised that the organisation is, “very encouraged by the Foreign Secretary’s visit to China. This is the first senior visit from the new government and sends a positive signal about the vital importance of our bilateral relationship”. 

“CBBC believes that such visits are key in underpinning strong economic engagement which not only supports our member companies with business in China but will also contribute to the government’s growth agenda”.

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“While it is still early days, there is a sense we may be entering a new chapter for UK-China relations. At the top of our list is a desire to see steps taken to address the absence of high-level government-to-government engagement, including the resumption of key dialogues,” Tom Simpson, Managing Director, China Operations & China Chief Representative, told FOCUS.

On July 7, two days after the election results were announced, Chinese Premier Li Qiang sent a message to Prime Minister Starmer to congratulate him on his win.

According to a readout published by Xinhua news, Li told Starmer that China “stands ready to work with the new British government”, and added that “strengthening coordination and cooperation between the two nations not only serves the interests of the two countries, but also is conducive to the unity of the international community in addressing global challenges.”

The ascent of Labour and the Liberal Democrats has resulted in a brand-new generation of MPs in Parliament, including the UK’s first Chinese-born MP, Yuan Yang, a former FT journalist, who is the MP for Earley and Woodley in Berkshire.

A new government will also entail a new foreign policy approach, including towards China. In an article for Foreign Affairs published prior to the election, Foreign Secretary David Lammy (then Shadow Foreign Secretary) set out his vision of “progressive realism” for foreign policy and vowed to “adopt a more consistent strategy” to China.

According to a pre-election summary of Labour’s foreign policy plans published by Reuters, the party aims to:

• Bring “a long-term and strategic approach” to managing Britain’s relations with China.
• Carry out an audit to improve Britain’s ability to understand and respond to the challenges and opportunities posed by China.
• Stand with and support members of the Hong Kong community who have relocated to the UK.

“We welcome the new government’s plan to conduct an audit of the UK-China relationship and have offered to support in any way possible,” said Simpson.

The government also aims to lead discussions to deepen trade and cooperation through organisations like the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which China has also applied to join.

Labour will be under pressure to deliver on the economy while in government, and stable relations with China may well be seen as a way to achieve that. Moreover, PM Starmer has previously noted that it would be impossible for the UK to “distance ourselves” completely from China on global issues like climate change.

As a result, Luke de Pulford, Director of Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, wrote that he expects to see greater UK-China engagement and perhaps softened criticism of China – despite Labour’s former position on issues such as China’s treatment of minorities.

“The environment remains challenging, and the new government inherits a relationship in need of work and not just on UK-China trade but also issues of global importance. Regardless, we remain optimistic about the change, and the reaction in China suggests there is a shared hope for relations improving in the coming years,” Simpson concludes.

Event: UK Election 2024, A New Chapter in UK-China Relations?

Don’t miss CBBC’s briefing on 25 July 2024 on the UK election outcome, the UK’s newly formed Labour Government and the potential implications for UK-China relations. The event will be held offline at CBBC’s Beijing office and online via Zoom.

The event will feature remarks from Richard Burn, Senior Advisor, APCO, and Chris Torrens, Managing Director, Greater China, APCO, followed by a panel discussion with Richard Burn, Chris Torrens, Kong Yuan, Researcher, Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Zhang Biao, Associate Professor in International Politics and Head of the Department, China University of Political Science and Law, moderated by Tom Simpson, Managing Director, China, CBBC.

Click here to register

The post What has the new Labour Government said about China? appeared first on Focus - China Britain Business Council.

Mr Cleverly met Chinese Vice President Han Zheng and Chinese Foreign Minister and Director of the Office of the Central Foreign and Affairs Commission Wang Yi in Beijing. For the meeting with Vice President Han, he was accompanied to the Great Hall of the People by the UK’s ambassador to China, HMA Dame Caroline Wilson.

The Foreign Secretary, James Cleverly meets with the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi for a Bilateral political meeting at the State Guest House, Beijing whilst on an official visit to China. Rory Arnold/No10 Downing Street

During the bilateral meetings, Mr Cleverly reiterated the UK’s approach to China, as set out in the Integrated Review Refresh and his Mansion House Speech earlier this year. He also raised issues such as cyber security, the National Security Law in Hong Kong, the treatment of Uyghur people in Xinjiang Province, and Chinese sanctions against UK politicians.

Xinhua reported that Chinese Vice President Han Zheng said the two sides “should uphold the spirit of mutual respect and win-win cooperation, accommodate each other’s core interests and major concerns, maintain communication in international and regional affairs, and jointly promote world peace and development.” He also said that the UK and China should create a sound business environment for economic and trade activities and actively explore new growth points for practical cooperation.

The Foreign Secretary, James Cleverly and HMA Caroline Wilson leaving the Great Hall of the People after meeting Vice Premier Han Zheng in Beijing. Rory Arnold/No10 Downing Street

Both sides agreed on the key global role of cooperation between the UK and China on important issues such as climate change, disease prevention and response, the development and regulation of AI, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

“The only way to influence China is to engage with China,” Mr Cleverly stressed in a video shared on the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office’s (FCDO) social channels. “That is why I’m here in Beijing. That is why I am meeting with Chinese ministers. That is why diplomacy is so incredibly important.”

Ahead of meeting Wang Yi, Cleverly chaired a roundtable with CBBC and a group of member companies at the Ambassador’s residence in Beijing. In attendance were representatives from finance, healthcare, automotive, hospitality, professional services and education. The conversation covered China’s current economic challenges, how British business is performing in China, and opportunities to grow trade and investment, as well as issues British companies face doing business in the world’s second-largest market.

Throughout the visit, Cleverly’s message was clear: the UK must not shy away from engaging with China.

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From the Integrated Review to IR2023

The IR is the preeminent guiding document on the way the UK sees relations with China at a time of global instability and when relations between China and the West are at their lowest ebb in decades. The refreshed IR, IR2023, frames the UK’s policy towards China in terms of protecting national interests, aligning with others to protect collective values, and engaging with China where possible. Versions of this framing are now almost standard for Western countries and the EU as they rethink their relations with China.

Much has changed since 2021, and the government has refined its approach to the country. We have seen, for instance, increased sensitivity to Chinese engagement in critical national infrastructure and cyber security; growing concerns regarding supply chain resilience and critical minerals; and increased scrutiny of academia and its relations with People’s Republic of China (PRC) entities. The Australia, United Kingdom, United States (AUKUS) defence partnership to counter China in the South China Seas has deepened.

IR23 reflects this changing thinking, with a more substantive and detailed discussion of China. Critically, that includes an increased emphasis on diplomacy, dialogue and engagement.

The publication itself says that “IR2023 also includes a clear articulation of the principles that will underpin the UK’s approach to bilateral relations with China, in which the importance of dialogue and diplomacy is emphasised. Ultimately, the UK seeks to re-establish a stable, constructive and frank relationship that can both create better conditions for cooperation and underpin the kind of strategic dialogue required to prevent miscalculation and misunderstanding.”

This is an important step in recognising the multifaceted and complex relationship the UK needs with China in the coming years. Developing an effective approach to engagement and cooperation now requires an action plan, clear priorities, strengthened capacities, and resources.

The need for constructive engagement on global challenges

This is in an era of ‘polycrisis’ and interconnected global challenges which require collective action.

All but the most ardent China hawks recognise the need for cooperation with China on global problems, and IR2023 namechecks climate change and global health. But these issues get much less air-time than the security issues outlined above. What are the UK’s priorities? How should we build effective forms of engagement around them?

Forging a new kind of relationship with China that mainstreams serious global challenges will not be straightforward, but is necessary. We ask what is needed to re-centre such challenges in our thinking as we navigate the choppy waters ahead.

Foreign Secretary James Cleverly meets Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister, as he attends the Munich Security Conference. Photo: Simon Dawson/No 10 Downing Street via UK Government on Flickr)

Rationales for engagement

In discussions of China strategy, engagement and cooperation are generally an afterthought, summarised as something like ‘climate change and pandemics’, as in IR2023. But this ignores the complexity of a major set of issues where China is an important factor, and which need to be thought through.

China is vital to many significant global challenges, given its size, systemic importance, regional presence, and technological advancement. Examples include health and development challenges such as antimicrobial resistance (AMR), food insecurity, plastic pollution, and developing country debt relief; governing frontier spaces such as digital tech, the arctic, and space; and stability issues, including financial stability, peace and security, and fragile states. Over the coming weeks, the IDS China Centre at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) will publish blogs exploring some of these key issues.

For countries reappraising their relations with China, thinking in terms of three kinds of challenges can help clarify what we are trying to achieve.

• Issues where China is system-critical, where progress cannot be made, or will be substantially diminished without China’s contribution. Examples include reducing greenhouse gas emissions, AMR, and biodiversity loss.
• Issues where China is a part of the solution to challenges facing developing countries. Examples include debt restructuring, investment in LMICs, and technologies developing countries need to respond to climate change, including solar or drought-resistant crops.
• Issues where it is in the enlightened self-interest of countries to have functioning relations. Examples include, nuclear proliferation, financial stability, peace and security, and regulation of new technologies.

Engaging with China as if the world matters

Geopolitical tensions should not trump effective coordination on global challenges that threaten humanity or the biosphere. And developing countries cannot be asked to choose between China and the West.

The world is becoming increasingly multipolar. China has expanded its role in the multilateral system, though not uniformly. It has also promoted new institutions and visions outside the existing system, most recently the Global Development Initiative. While these provoke wariness, dismissing them is shortsighted.

China was critical to the Paris Agreement and the recent successful negotiation of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. It will inevitably also be important in shaping the successor agreements to the Sustainable Development Goals. Informed, grounded engagement on the kinds of global challenges outlined above is vital to make this a constructive process and to build consensus around viable responses to the crises humanity and the biosphere face.

Where now?

Relations between China and most developed countries are at a decades-long low. There are no easy fixes, and there are fault lines that risk destabilising relations further. What can be done?

There is a need in most Western capitals to articulate a clearer case for informed, strategic engagement, backed by clear priorities and strategy. This is not naïveté or accommodating China: as Jessica Chen Weiss says: “we have to try”.

The UK has many strengths. It is respected in development policy and practice, and in science, including biomedicine and climate sciences. It has a history of engaging China in international development, including through trilateral cooperation in third countries. This provides a foundation, and a basis of trust, but one that will erode if neglected for too long.

Jurisdictions such as the European Union and Australia are strengthening research and study of China. It is now time to seriously invest, recognising that China’s global impacts affect almost all areas of policy, and that UK capacity to engage must keep pace.

The IR2023 plan to double spending on China capabilities within government, including language training, is welcome. But capacities needed to support effective engagement are not limited to government. More is needed, including:

• Funding for engagement on global challenges where China is a significant factor, including strengthening relationships with China, with third countries – and where possible with China in third countries – to contribute to the delivery of key global public goods.
• A jointly-funded China research programme delivered through UKRI, building on previous successful collaborations, and supporting research on global challenges that need to be addressed with China.
• A strategy to improve China knowledge and language training in schools and higher education institutions, including China-focused modules in a range of degree courses.

As the UK does this, aligning with other countries and actors with progressive approaches to engagement will be important.

IR2023 identifies China as an ‘epoch-defining challenge’. This is the moment to step up to the unavoidable but neglected challenge of appropriate cooperation with China, clarifying the benefits of doing so, mitigating risks, identifying clear priorities and entry points, and investing in capacities to deliver.

Images from UK Government via Flickr (see original sources here and here)

This article was first published as “Engaging China on global challenges: Responding to the Integrated Review 2023” by the Institute of Development Studies

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Former president Jiang Zemin passed away in Shanghai on 30 November 2022 at the age of 96. He was given a state funeral in Beijing on the morning of Tuesday, 6 December, marked by the sounding of air raid sirens in cities across the country and a three-minute silence in Hong Kong.

British Ambassador to China, Caroline Wilson DCMG, attended the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Sunday, 4 December to sign the official book of condolence on behalf of the UK, writing: “My sincere condolences on the death of former president Jiang Zemin this week. He welcomed our Late Queen Elizabeth II to Shanghai during her State Visit to China in 1986, and became the first serving Chinese leader to visit the UK in 1999. His passing is a great loss to the people of China.”

Like Queen Elizabeth II, Jiang was born in 1926, and was Party Secretary and Mayor of Shanghai when he met her in the city in 1986. Just a few years after the queen’s visit, he went on to become general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party from 1989 to 2002, then president of China from 1993 to 2003.

Jiang’s tenure witnessed unprecedented economic growth in China and saw the country “enter the world”, culminating in it joining the World Trade Organisation in December 2001. He frequently engaged with foreign leaders both at home and abroad – often in a more spontaneous, personal manner than his predecessors or successors – including a four-day state visit to the UK in October 1999.

During the state visit, Jiang attended a CBBC-organised business lunch at the Banqueting House in Whitehall and met then CBBC President Sir Charles Powell.

CBBC President Sir Charles Powell with President Jiang Zemin in London, October 1999

Jiang’s visit to the UK came soon after the handover ceremony marking Hong Kong’s transfer of sovereignty from the UK to China in 1997, which Jiang attended alongside Prince Charles, representing Queen Elizabeth, and then Prime Minister Tony Blair.

Images: Alamy, CBBC

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The Politburo Standing Committee, formally known as the Standing Committee of the Central Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, is China’s most powerful decision-making body and currently made up of seven top political leaders (historically, membership has varied from five to a high of 11 people in the reshuffled 8^th PSC in 1966).

The Committee is selected every five years by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as by incumbent members of the Politburo and the Standing Committee. All members hold at least one high-level Party position. The current Politburo Standing Committee (the 20^th of its kind) was elected by the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on 23 October 2022.

Below is the current line-up of the 20^th Politburo Standing Committee (changes from the previous line up are marked ‘new’):

Xi Jinping

Xi Jinping remains as the number one ranking member of the committee. As General Secretary, he is the “core leader” of the Party and also commander-in-chief of the Chinese military as Chairman of the CCP and PRC Central Military Commissions. Xi also holds the title of President of the People’s Republic of China.

Born in Beijing, Xi was governor of Fujian and Zhejiang before being named Hu Jintao’s successor in 2008. His political theory, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” was written into the Party constitution by the 19th CCCPC.

Li Qiang (new)

Li Qiang is Party Secretary of Shanghai and a close personal ally of Xi (he was Xi’s chief of staff when he was governor of Zhejiang). Many expect him to replace Li Keqiang when he steps down from the premiership during the National People’s Congress in March 2023.

Li Qiang was in charge of Shanghai during the city’s widespread Covid lockdowns in early 2022, which some commentators have suggested is a sign of tacit approval of his willingness to run with such strict lockdowns (and, potentially, an indication that such Covid policies will continue).

Zhao Leji

Zhao Leji was formerly Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (succeeding another noted Xi ally, Wang Qishan), where he was instrumental in the far-reaching anti-corruption campaign that Xi kicked off when he became leader in 2012. He will succeed Li Zhanshu as Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in March 2023.

Born in China’s western Qinghai province, Zhao rose through the political ranks there to eventually become Party Secretary at just 42 years old – the youngest Chinese official ever to become a provincial governor – before being transferred to Shaanxi province as Party Secretary.

Leadership structure of the CCP

Wang Huning

One of China’s top political theorists, Wang Huning is First Secretary of the Central Secretariat of the Communist Party of China. He is thought to have played a key role in assisting Xi Jinping in crafting his “China Dream” and “Xi Jinping Thought” ideologies. He is also associated with the idea behind the Belt and Road Initiative.

Born in Shanghai, Wang attended some of that city’s top academic institutions and was referred to work for the Party’s central authorities by a number of leading Shanghai politicians back in 1995. He is notable for having never been in charge of running a province or major city.

Cai Qi (new)

Beijing Party Secretary Cai Qi is a familiar name but was nevertheless a surprise entry to the PSC. That being said, he is very close to Xi, having worked under him in Zhejiang and his home province of Fujian.

Although already in a high-level position, Cai Qi gained further favour for successfully overseeing the Beijing Winter Olympics in early 2022, avoiding any Covid outbreaks associated with the event.

Ding Xuexiang (new)

Ding Xuexiang is one of Xi’s most trusted aides, serving as Director of the Office of the General Secretary of the CCP (aka Xi’s chief of staff), as well as Director of the CCP General Office. This gives him a great deal of control over access to top-level information, as well as access to Xi himself. Some speculate that, of all of the PSC members, he has spent the most professional one-on-one time with Xi , having accompanied him on many official visits in China and abroad.

Like Wang Huning, Ding has never been in charge of running a province or major city, although he served in the Shanghai Party committee when Xi was interim Shanghai Party Secretary in 2007.

Li Xi (new)

Li Xi has just taken over from Zhao Leji as Secretary of the Central Commission of Discipline Inspection. He is also Party Secretary of Guangdong Province, where he has spearheaded the development of the Greater Bay Area economic region, a favourite project of Xi’s.

Li Xi has had a fairly standard rise to power, holding various Party positions in his home province of Gansu, as well as serving as Party Secretary of the revolutionarily significant city of Yan’an, the endpoint of the Long March. Li Xi is thought to have known Xi through family connections since the 1980s.

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In American political circles, China is seen as both a disease and a cure. As President Biden leads the Democrats to the polls for the mid-term elections in November, detente with China could stave off inflation, which analysts expect to be the number one issue among voters. However, a China-dominated world would also be “darker and harsher for American families, and it’s one [the US] needs to stand against,” according to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.  Meanwhile, among Democrats and Republicans alike, polling suggests that voters believe that limiting China’s power and influence is a top priority and that they feel ‘cold’ towards China, despite also considering climate change to be the number one national security threat and only solvable through compromising with China. 

It is an equally complex picture on the other side of the Pacific. Despite the increasing frequency of rhetoric coming out of Beijing signalling that China feels comfortable pitting itself against the US in Asia-Pacific affairs (eg, the Taiwan Strait does not constitute international waters) Beijing is discovering that it is going to need to work with Washington if it is to make the region more agreeable to China’s rise. Very tellingly, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi recently failed to persuade 10 countries in the Pacific to sign a regional agreement on trade and security, demonstrating that Beijing’s neighbours are not about to turn their backs on the US and accept China’s worldview. What is more, as in the US, there is also the issue that domestic political concerns demand boosting trade and investment between the pair – the zero Covid strategy isn’t going to pay for itself. 

Finally, both countries’ respective business communities have made it clear that they would value relations easing to a more predictable and manageable level. US companies in the country’s technology sector, in particular, have lost billions of dollars’ worth of business due to the Trump administration’s decision to put Chinese technology companies with ties to the military on a ‘black list.’ Meanwhile, Chinese firms are continuing to look overseas for investment opportunities that are more stable than those on offer at home, and see the US as a key growth market, assuming the geo-political climate improves.

Background

For all the headlines trumpeting the prospects of a second Cold War and the tweets by American and Chinese politicians and thought leaders alike seeking to stir up their respective bases to distrust and demonise the other, US-China relations fundamentally appear to be easing. Circumstances change, and the current circumstances in which the US and China find themselves warrant both sides taking time to reflect on their respective priorities. 

This de-escalation comes from a high starting point, make no mistake, and will not result in US-China relations returning to a level of amicability similar to that which was maintained by both sides during the Obama administration. It’s unlikely that President Biden will be received by President Xi any time soon as a guest of honour at the Forbidden City (as was President Trump) nor will he want to be seen as accommodating China by offering a bow to his Chinese hosts (American media lambasted President Obama over this in 2012). Furthermore, hostility over topics such as Taiwan, Xinjiang and Hong Kong, as well as fair trade practices, will probably remain – but both sides appear to recognise the need to bring the rhetoric down a notch.

A little more conversation, a little less action, please 

Recently, both sides have become far more vocal on an apparent shared desire for more talks. Presidents Xi and Biden last spoke in March, and another call is reportedly in the works for as soon as July. The pair also spoke in November 2021, while their call in September of that year was the first in seven months, indicating that both sides see value in increasing the frequency with which they speak. And it’s not just at the president-to-president level: other senior officials, such as US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin, Chinese Minister of National Defence Wei Fenghe, US Trade Representative Katherine Tai, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, and China’s economic tsar, Vice-Premier Liu He, have all increased the frequency with which they engage with one another, too. 

That said, just because American and Chinese leaders are engaging more does not necessarily mean they agree on more. Indeed, the recent meeting at the Shangri-La Dialogue between Lloyd Austin and Wei Fenghe demonstrates this well, for the pair presented duelling narratives at the annual gathering of the great and good of Asia-Pacific defence and security. What’s more, the US is not always speaking to the right person, particularly on the subject of Taiwan. For example, while Wei Fenghe is nominally Lloyd Austin’s direct counterpart, Austin reports directly to President Biden, whereas Wei answers to China’s Central Military Commission, the vice-chair of which, Xu Qiliang, is seen as having the ear of President Xi.

Agree to disagree 

While both sides seem to place increasing value on engagement, there are issues where the two sides will continue to disagree vehemently – international free trade and Xinjiang are two prime examples. The US and China might have come to recognise the constraints of their interdependence, but that does not mean that they will not move to advance their respective agendas in matters which fall outside the fundamental areas in which they cooperate, such as the environment and growing non-sensitive bilateral trade and investment. 

US companies will still need to tread carefully around China, even if both countries’ officials are starting slowly to accommodate each other more at the highest levels of government. The US’ Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act (UFLPA) which came into effect on Tuesday 21 June, for example, requires companies that import goods from China’s Xinjiang region to provide “clear and convincing evidence” that no component was produced with slave labour; this is likely to be very difficult to do given the complexity of US firms’ supply chains. 

The UFLPA is a piece of legislation that, when viewed in isolation, suggests the Biden administration is continuing to take a hard line on China. Read it alongside President Biden’s recently announced plan to cut some tariffs placed on Chinese imports by the Trump administration, however, and it becomes clear that President Biden is signalling that trade with China remains important to the US, but within increasingly tightly defined parameters.

While the two will continue to disagree with one another on issues such as Taiwan and international free trade, both countries’ governments appear to have realised that there is room for greater pragmatism in areas such as the environment 

Tariffs 

One could argue that this is a more nuanced and pragmatic approach by the US towards its trade relationship with China, especially when compared with the Trump administration’s modus operandi of placing Chinese firms on sweeping blacklists imitating the various market access lists maintained by China. 

The US is standing up to China where their values do not align and compromising where it is in America’s interests to do so. This is further evidenced by the Biden administration’s plans to change its approach towards China over free trade, which up to this point has been to punish Beijing with tariffs. 

Lifting some of the tariffs on $370 billion worth of imported Chinese goods could alleviate inflation by as much as 1% over the next six months; with inflation in the US currently running at 8.5% on the year, that could be tempting.  

US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has said that some of the tariffs currently placed on Chinese imports serve “no strategic purpose,” while US Trade Representative Katherine Tai has indicated that the tariffs predominantly serve as a way of maintaining leverage over the Chinese in negotiations surrounding levelling the playing field for US firms in China and third markets. Removing some of the tariffs is in America’s interests as it will push down consumer prices and ease inflation; keeping others in place reminds China that the world’s most powerful economy takes issue with how it trades.

The CBBC view 

Though it may be hard to see, US-China relations appear to be thawing. While the two will continue to disagree with one another on issues such as Taiwan, international free trade, and human rights, both countries’ governments appear to have realised that there is room for greater pragmatism in areas such as the environment and bilateral trade and investment. Furthermore, even on those topics where they do not see eye to eye, the realisation that a conflict would not be in either country’s interests appears to be sinking in, leading to increased engagement on these sticking points. 

US companies will need to continue to tread carefully in and around China, and vice-versa, and their government affairs teams will have to pay even closer attention to the signals coming out of Beijing and Washington, such is the sensitivity of the relationship – but the US and China appear to have realised the constraint that is their interdependence, which is no small thing. 

It’s good news for UK plc in China, too. With the US government adopting a far more clearly defined approach towards China, British companies dealing with both the US and China should anticipate the regulatory uncertainty that has significantly impacted companies trading between the two to ease significantly.

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