Writing in The Guardian ahead of the visit, Miliband said: “The only way to respond to [the climate crisis] is with decisive action at home and abroad… climate action at home without pushing larger countries to do their fair share would not protect current and future generations. Emissions know no borders, and we will only protect our farmers, our pensioners and our children if we get other countries of the world to play their part.”

On Monday 17 March, Ed Miliband met with Chinese Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang in Beijing. The two sides agreed to enhance cooperation in jointly addressing climate change. Ding, also a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, noted that China is ready to work with the UK to earnestly implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of both countries, consolidate the momentum for improvement and development of bilateral ties, deepen cooperation in areas such as financial services, trade and investment and low-carbon development, and jointly address climate change to better benefit the people of both countries and the world.

Miliband and China’s National Energy Administrator Minister, Wang Hongzhi, also co-hosted the 8th China-UK Energy Dialogue in Beijing on 17 March. The two sides exchanged views on topics including clean energy technologies, energy transition, energy security and global energy governance. Following the dialogue, Miliband and Minister Wang signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the China-UK Clean Energy Partnership, which identifies priorities for collaboration, including power market reform, power grids, battery storage, offshore wind energy, carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS), clean low-carbon and renewable hydrogen.

Earlier, on Saturday, 15 March, Miliband met with China’s Ecology and Environment Minister, Huang Runqiu, and held in-depth discussions on topics including cooperation in climate change. Minister Huang outlined China’s policies, actions, and achievements in combating climate change, expressing China’s willingness further to deepen policy dialogue and practical cooperation with the UK in areas such as carbon markets, climate investment and financing, and climate adaptation. He emphasised that such collaboration would contribute positively to global climate governance.

The Energy Secretary will refresh the 10-year-old UK Clean Energy Partnership with China – which will now provide clarity on areas where the UK government can securely collaborate with China on areas of mutual benefit – such as new emerging technologies, including hydrogen and carbon capture and storage. The UK will also share expertise on phasing out coal, having closed its last coal-fired power station last year.

Ed Miliband said:  

“We can only keep future generations safe from climate change if all major emitters act. It is simply an act of negligence to today’s and future generations not to engage China on how it can play its part in taking action on climate. 

That is why I will be meeting Chinese ministers for frank conversations about how both countries can fulfil the aims of the Paris Climate Agreement, to which both countries are signed up.  

Our Plan for Change and clean energy superpower mission is about energy security, lower bills, good jobs and growth for the British people. It is with this mission that we can also influence climate action on a global stage, fight for our way of life and keep our planet safe for our children and grandchildren.”

Coinciding with Miliband’s visit to China, CBBC, in partnership with the British Embassy and the British Chamber of Commerce in China, hosted the UK-China Clean Energy Reception in Beijing. The event brought together nearly 200 guests, including representatives from the UK government, Chinese companies and UK businesses, providing a valuable platform for business and government stakeholders to network and explore collaboration opportunities in the sector. 

CBBC’s Chief Executive Peter Burnett, who is visiting China, attended the event alongside Tom Simpson, CBBC’s Managing Director for China.

Speaking at the event, CBBC’s Chief Executive Peter Burnett said:

“There are important shared objectives between businesses in the UK and China, including tackling climate change, promoting sustainability, and developing clean, efficient, and safe energy solutions. For businesses, this dialogue is incredibly important. All successful businesses mitigate as much risk from their operations as they can. Managing climate-related risks has become an essential business objective, particularly as we have seen the significant impact of climate change worldwide. At CBBC, we will continue to prioritise this issue. Addressing climate change is not just necessary – it also supports economic growth, prosperity, and job creation.”

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Work on a new national climate action plan is in full swing, with the focus being on targets for 2035, China’s climate envoy Liu Zhenmin told Dialogue Earth at a World Economic Forum meeting in Dalian this June.

Signatories to the Paris Agreement must submit such action plans, known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), every five years. The aim is to ratchet up ambition towards keeping global warming within 2°C of preindustrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. While the NDCs are national commitments, they reflect global ambition on climate governance. Targets for 2035 are due by February next year.

As a major emitter, China’s NDCs are closely watched. Research has found that the country is on track to meet its current NDC and, in some fields, is surpassing expectations. Nevertheless, the country needs to do more to align with the 1.5°C target, experts say.

Looking a decade into the past and future, what factors should China consider? What changes are likely to be made in its 2035 goals? We asked specialists from China and elsewhere what they thought.

Setting targets that support clean energy

China’s first NDC, submitted in 2015, was updated in 2021 with only minor changes. Now that China has 10 years of experience setting and updating NDCs, experts say the country can be bolder with both the scope and ambition of its targets.

“The framework of the 2021 update was based on that designed in 2013-2014. That was a decade ago, and China’s new NDC should reflect the changes since,” said Li Shuo, director of the China Climate Hub at the Asia Society Policy Institute, a thinktank headquartered in the US.

The last 10 years have seen China surpass expectations in many areas of the low-carbon transition. By the end of 2023, for example, it had installed over 1.5 terawatts of renewable energy-generation capacity – 15 times the level of a decade ago. China accounted for 37% of the global total of wind and solar power generated in 2023.

Growth in “new energy vehicles” (NEVs) has been another highlight. In 2023, 9.5 million were sold in China, representing over 60% of global sales. Ouyang Minggao, a member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, has told the media that 100 million NEVs are expected to be on China’s roads by 2030.

Li Shuo said: “China could consider adding new industrial targets to its NDC goals, such as NEV market share or emissions reductions in the steel and cement sectors.” He thinks that the NDC could better take into account the prospects of differing industries and thus feature more ambitious targets.

Hu Min, director and co-founder of Chinese thinktank the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress, believes that when considering the ambition level of the NDC, changes in the international environment need to be considered alongside developments in China.

“The main change in external conditions is that global emissions cuts aren’t keeping up with the gravity of the climate change problem,” she said. “Also, green trade policies proposed by the EU and US have had a huge impact on global cooperation on clean technology.”

At last year’s UN climate conference, COP28, nations committed to “work together” to triple global renewable-generation capacity, to 11 terawatts, by 2030. The speed and scale of China’s renewables rollout will be vital to achieving that goal. Global capacity is currently on track to hit 8 terawatts by 2030, with China to account for 3.2 terawatts of that, according to a recent International Energy Agency review of national climate plans.

Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), a thinktank based in Finland, says that China should set NDC targets that support ongoing growth in the clean-energy industry. This would help speed up the global transition and ease growth bottlenecks in domestic markets.

“It’s essential for China to set NDC targets that support the continued growth of these industries,” he said. “Unambitious targets would mean declining demand for clean-energy technologies. This would result in a dramatically worsened overcapacity situation, financial distress and intensified concerns about dumping from China’s trade partners.”

Should China cut its emissions rapidly or gradually?

The warming thresholds set in the Paris Agreement are benchmarks for global climate action, and the basis on which NDCs should be updated. In May this year, China’s climate envoy Liu Zhenmin attended a meeting of the US-China Working Group on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s. The official readout of the meeting said both countries welcomed COP28’s call for countries to submit 2035 NDCs that are “economy-wide, cover all greenhouse gases, and are 1.5°C-aligned”. This suggests China’s NDC update will be aimed at the 1.5°C limit.

China’s 2021 NDC update was designed for the 2°C limit. Its targets for the share of non-fossil energy sources and carbon intensity were drawn from 2020 research into 2°C scenarios by Tsinghua University’s Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development.

A shift to the 1.5°C target would likely mean the addition of a target for a reduction in carbon emissions, expressed as a percentage of their peak. Since 2015, China’s plan has been to peak its carbon emissions before 2030. Research institutes in China and overseas dispute whether the subsequent fall should be gradual but with increasing speed (a curved line on a graph), or steep and rapid (an acute straight line).

An assessment by the Asia Society Policy Institute says that alignment with the 1.5°C target requires 2035 emissions to be 30% below their peak value – or, in the most ambitious scenario, 80% below.

Myllyvirta said: “A 30% reduction would also mean following a straight-line pathway from the emission peak to carbon neutrality before 2060. This makes it a consistent and credible approach to implementing the long-term target. Aiming for less emissions reduction before 2035 will mean greater pressure to reduce emissions in the period from then until 2060.”

But China’s own experts say that the emissions graph should form a curve – slower falls after peak carbon, speeding up over time. Teng Fei, deputy director of Tsinghua University’s Institute of Energy, Environment and Economy, said there will be various uncertainties around the time of peak carbon, and carbon emissions are not going to peak and then immediately start falling.

“Bringing emissions down will mean fighting a lot of inertia in energy systems. It’s very likely that we won’t see big falls in absolute terms in the five years post peak, but that things will speed up later,” Teng told Dialogue Earth. He said modelling shows a gradual fall between 2035 to 2040, with an increasingly steep downward curve after.

Uncertainties around peak carbon and GDP growth

Many studies have shown that China can hit peak carbon before 2030 as it has pledged to. But exactly when, and how high the peak is, will have a big impact on its emission trajectory.

The State Council recently published a work plan for gradually shifting China’s focus towards controlling carbon emissions, away from the current focus on energy consumption. Accordingly, it said that the 2026 to 2030 period would rely mainly on carbon intensity targets, with caps serving a complementary role. Once emissions have peaked, the cap will become the main measure, with intensity targets secondary.

“The question is, when will China decide it has hit peak carbon and make that shift?” said Li Shuo. “China has always said its peak will come later than research bodies have predicted, and that may lead the government to take less action on the climate than researchers expect.”

When setting its climate goals, China should also take into account economic growth trends, the experts say. Carbon-intensity targets depend on the relationship between GDP and total carbon emissions. Meeting carbon caps, meanwhile, will require carbon intensity to fall faster than the economy grows.

China’s carbon intensity has fallen 51% since 2005, and Teng Fei told Dialogue Earth that reductions have been steady in recent years, at about 3-4% annually. The biggest factor impacting total emissions is therefore the GDP growth rate, he added, but uncertainties over that rate make it hard for China to set an appropriate cap.

“Developed countries can commit to a carbon cap because they see regular GDP growth of around 2% or 3% without big fluctuations,” Teng explained. “But nobody can say if China’s growth rate is going to hold at 5% up to 2030. It could be higher, it could be lower.”

The pressing task, then, is to decouple economic growth and carbon emissions. Between 2019 and 2023, infrastructure, manufacturing capacity and real estate were major drivers of Chinese growth, according to research by the International Energy Agency. In 2023, China’s energy-intensity figure was down 0.5% year-on-year, with carbon intensity also holding steady.

Indicators from the first half of this year show China’s real-estate market is still in a slump, and profits from infrastructure investments are decreasing. The traditional drivers of growth in China are losing power.

But Yao Zhe, global policy advisor for Greenpeace East Asia, says clean and low-carbon industries, such as electric-vehicle and renewable-energy manufacturing chains, are becoming new growth drivers. “Simon Stiell, executive secretary of the UN climate convention, has encouraged looking at climate action plans as blueprints for future investment,” she said. “The economic benefits give China good reason to raise climate targets and decouple carbon emissions from growth.”

Will the NDC targets include all greenhouse gases?

Experts told Dialogue Earth that the new NDC is very likely to contain emissions targets that include non-CO2 greenhouse gases.

China’s talk of peak emissions has usually been in terms of CO2 emissions. There has never been any official statement on whether carbon neutrality means neutrality for all greenhouse gases. However, Xie Zhenhua, China’s former climate envoy, said on a number of occasions that 2060 neutrality would include other greenhouse gases.

Teng Fei, of Tsinghua University, said: “Personally, I think the 2035 NDC should cover all greenhouse gases. It would be a significant advance in its coverage.”

Lauri Myllyvirta agrees on the importance of covering other greenhouse gases besides CO2, adding that the new NDC should also make clear that the coverage applies to the 2060 carbon-neutrality target.

There are signs that the political will does exist to cover non-CO2 greenhouse gases. Last November, China published an action plan on controlling methane emissions, though without any quantitative targets. The same month, China and the US released their Sunnylands Statement on boosting shared climate action. It said both countries would build on their “respective national methane action plans to develop their respective methane reduction actions/targets for inclusion in their 2035 NDCs and support each country’s methane reduction/control progress.”

Over a century, methane has 28 to 34 times the global warming potential of CO2, so controlling it can play an outsized role in mitigating warming.

Teng Fei’s research team has found that China’s non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions have already peaked, he told Dialogue Earth. Emissions of methane, the main gas in that group, are falling in both the agricultural and energy sectors, he added. While coal output has grown in recent years, most of the expansion has been from open-pit mining, which produces less methane than shaft mining. However, China’s current carbon-accounting taxonomy doesn’t completely reflect the fall.

“Our research found that methane emissions from China’s energy sector peaked in 2013-2014 and are now 20% below that. This has driven falls in non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions,” Teng said. “This means including all greenhouse gases will still allow for a pre-2030 peak, followed by falls. The main question is how fast those falls will come, and to what level. That will have a huge impact on how we reach carbon neutrality.”

This article was originally published on Dialogue Earth and has been reproduced under the Creative Commons BY NC ND licence.

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A new report supported by Energy Foundation China, the NGO I work for, contains some fascinating findings on the climate attitudes of China’s 15 to 24 year olds, or Gen Z, as they’re more often known. It also offers helpful advice on how to communicate with them in a way that builds their support for climate action.

Gen Z are well aware of the central government’s “dual-carbon targets” to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and reduce them to net zero by 2060. They are interested in the job opportunities that this low-carbon transition is creating. But they lack awareness of how climate issues will affect their lives in myriad other ways.

To nurture a Gen Z person that actively participates in climate action and influences peers to do likewise, climate communicators need to speak to their life values. Climate stories should emphasise opportunities for personal growth, avoid overly negative stories, and provide hope for the future.

Gen Z are crucial movers in the low-carbon transition

“How will China’s carbon-reduction targets affect your lifestyle decisions?” I asked.

“Maybe I’ll buy an electric car someday,” a young person answered.

This exchange took place in late 2023 at a Beijing conference on young people’s participation in climate issues. The participants, mostly recent or soon-to-be university graduates who had braved the capital’s cold winter to attend, all said China’s dual-carbon targets had been a major influence on their career choices. But when I asked for other concrete changes that those targets might encourage them to make in their lives, “buying an electric car” was the most common answer. This is despite the ambitious national targets that require an overhaul of the energy system.

The exchange reflects the views of some members of China’s Gen Z. They approve of China having strong climate policies, but don’t know enough about what the actual impacts will be.

Gen Z generally refers to people born between 1995 and 2009. In China, they make up 19% of the population, or 267 million people. The cohort grew up with the internet and is acutely aware of how technology has progressed and driven social change. The country’s ongoing journey towards meeting the dual-carbon targets will encompass their “blooming” years. In adolescence, early adulthood and middle age, Gen Z will experience even more new technologies and products becoming mainstream, and consumption habits changing, as economic development decouples from carbon emissions. For this reason, their backing and participation are vital if global climate targets are to be achieved.

To gain lessons for communications endeavours in this area, Tsinghua University’s School of Journalism and Communications has conducted research with support from Energy Foundation (EF) China. The findings were recently published in a report, “Engaging China’s Generation Z: Research on life values and climate communication”.

What do Gen Z think about climate change and the measures being taken to tackle it? How will they cope with the changes those measures will bring? And how can climate communications resonate with their life values and concerns? We break down our findings here.

How do life values affect Gen Z’s climate stance?

The study concentrated on the 3,552 Gen Z who had taken part in a 2023 survey of Chinese people of all ages, which had grouped all participants into six segments based on their life values.

There are the “Backbone Traditionalists”, who believe hard work will lead to success, and have strong trust in the government (23% of Gen Z participants). “Passionate Strivers” focus both on their careers and making positive impacts on society (18%). “Moderate Pragmatists” embrace traditional customs and virtues while rejecting rigidity and opposing stereotyping (23%). “Philosophical Observers” value autonomy and driving social progress through self-development (17%). “Easygoing Leisurists” value self discovery and seek to avoid conflicts (9%); and “Disengaged Individualists” value self expression and may be detached from political and community issues (10%). 

We need to ensure Gen Z are aware of the systemic reforms to technology, the economy, consumption and social attitudes needed

We found that the life values of these groups correlate with their awareness of climate change and their willingness to take action. The Backbone Traditionalists, Passionate Strivers and Moderate Pragmatists (totalling 64%) exhibited higher levels of awareness of climate change and a perception of its risks, and are more motivated to act. Meanwhile, the Philosophical Observers and Easygoing Leisurists (totalling 26%), showed low awareness and are less compelled to act. Similarly, the Disengaged Individualists had low awareness and sense of risk, and had reservations about climate policy.

Raising awareness still key

Gen Z are very aware of how macro-level factors such as climate policy can change how the country develops – and the available opportunities. But they lack a sense of urgency regarding acting on climate change, and do not see it as something affecting their own lives, and the research backed this up.

More respondents say climate change impacts the natural environment (93.8%) than say it impacts economic growth (83.8%). And while they express concern about climate change, they tend to see it not as urgent, but as a long-term issue to be tackled after, for example, poverty. Their understanding of climate science is also poor, with an average score of 2.69 out of 7.

Helping people see the connections between their own lives and climate issues isn’t easy. But we need Gen Z to understand the risks climate change brings, and not just that they might need to buy an electric vehicle or consider the new jobs it brings. We need to ensure they are aware of the systemic reforms to technology, the economy, consumption and social attitudes that are needed, and the impact these will have on their lives. That will help Gen Z see the connection and promote their individual participation in climate action.

There have been signs Gen Z’s awareness and life values are changing. The research found that, compared to participants aged 18 to 22, those between 23 and 27 are more rational and pragmatic, and show more critical thinking, with more Moderate Pragmatists and Philosophical Observers among their ranks. Those who have started working also demonstrate more awareness of climate risks. This shows that Gen Z’s life values can change, something climate communicators should take into account.

Positive climate narratives can spur action

Our research also found some characteristics common to all Gen Z segments. That is, dreaming of “lying flat” but also of career success.

Some think today’s youth are too focused on enjoying themselves and are unable to do hard work. We found, however, that while 58.5% of respondents agreed that there is “no point in making demanding plans, as the future is too uncertain”, 89.7% agreed that they “constantly improve [their] social skills and hope to become successful”. This apparent contradiction reflects the fact that Gen Z are generally exhausted by living in a highly competitive society, and turned off by negative information – yet they retain hopes for a better future, personal growth and opportunities.

That will affect how they act on climate change. All segments apart from the Backbone Traditionalists were more inclined to agree with language emphasising personal growth, such as job opportunities. Some, such as the Easygoing Leisurists and Disengaged Individualists, were more focused on themselves and less inclined to think they could take effective climate action. Overstressing the severity and irreversibility of the climate crisis could fail to grab their interest, or even repel them.

Accordingly, if climate communications are to speak to Gen Z, we must accommodate their desire for change and a better future. This can be done by focusing on “self-improvement” and informing Gen Z about how climate change interacts with social and personal development. The report has advice specific to each segment, but there are general principles. That is, climate communicators should tell more stories about the synergies between the response to climate change and technological advances, social and economic improvements, and personal development. Stories about new types of jobs created by the journey towards carbon neutrality, for instance, can spark a sense of optimism in Gen Z and encourage them to keep moving forward.

Reaching out to a new audience

Climate communicators have always faced a trio of challenges. How to reach those outside of climate circles? How to encourage public participation in climate action? And how to make those participating feel they have made an impact?

The research found some members of Gen Z are sceptical about the emissions impact of individual action. They support actions which are achievable and do not reduce quality of life, but are more reluctant to take actions involving extra costs. In contrast, many members of Gen Z, including the Backbone Traditionalists, Passionate Strivers and Moderate Pragmatists (which together represent a majority), are willing to practise what they preach on climate action and are positive about the impacts such action has. The study also found that nearly three-quarters of respondents approved of actions within their community to stop climate change, and said they would encourage others to take similar actions. This may be linked to high scores for valuing self-transcendence, communitarianism and political efficacy in these groups.

Reaching out to these “activists” may be one way to expand climate actions beyond climate circles. Strengthening links with these groups who score highly on political efficacy and self-transcendence, and perhaps even providing them with more support and choices, could turn these people into new “climate messengers”. This would mean moving their actions beyond changes in personal consumption styles, such as buying an electric car, and towards positively influencing other people.

The study also found that members of Gen Z identify strongly with their social circle and community. Accordingly, climate communicators could consider linking climate change with the social and personal issues different groups are concerned about and, by using social influence within circles and communities, reach new people and bring them on board.

This is just the beginning of research into climate-change communications and the life-values segmentation of the Chinese public. We hope it will provide new inspiration and ideas for those working in the field. As research continues, there is much scope for cohort studies, which track particular segments of the population over time, as well as designing narratives with broad appeal, and implementing and evaluating communications programmes.

This article was originally published on Dialogue Earth and has been reproduced under the Creative Commons BY NC ND licence.

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“At about 2pm, the sky went dark and water started leaking into the office. Heavy rain and flood warnings started to appear on Weibo and some of my colleagues put on their waterproofs and went home to check on their families. At the time, I had no idea how serious the situation would get,” recalls one eyewitness who lived through the Zhengzhou floods in July 2021.

Between 17 and 20 July, rainfall in the city broke all records since the Zhengzhou meteorological bureau had been set up in 1951. Chinese scientists have concluded that climate change made the rain significantly heavier.

The downpour did not arrive out of the blue. According to Beijing News, city and county meteorological bureaus in Henan issued 1,184 warnings. On 20 July alone, the Zhengzhou bureau issued 10 red rain warnings. They contained guidance that: government and other bodies should take appropriate preparatory and rescue measures; gatherings should be cancelled with students and workers sent home; and measures should be taken to prevent or respond to floods and mudslides.

But the warnings did not have the intended effects. The city government did not tell workplaces and schools to close, and a recommendation to “stagger commute times” only came after most people had arrived at work. Measures to reduce risks on the subway and in road and rail tunnels came late. As a result, 380 people died or went missing in Zhengzhou, according to a State Council investigation, with the death toll rising to 398 province-wide.

This highlights the importance of early warning systems and preparedness measures for extreme weather. If we think of “sponge cities” and levees as the hardware of climate adaptation, then the emergency response systems and risk awareness lacking in Henan are its software.

In June 2022, the central government published its National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 2035, which calls for a climate-adapted society to be “basically completed” by that year. When compared to the first such strategy, published in 2013, the new version emphasises the importance of monitoring, early warning and risk management. It also stresses building communication and performance assessment systems, and improving cross-departmental cooperation. In other words, the update places more focus on the software.

Now, Chinese cities and communities need to figure out how to put that in place.

Early warning systems: Guangdong’s 31631 model

Unlike landlocked Henan, coastal Guangdong is used to dealing with typhoons and heavy rain. Shortly after the Henan floods, the central government promoted a “progressive rain warning system” already in use in Shenzhen and Guangdong nationwide. Known as “31631”, each number indicates the time between warnings before an extreme weather event. So, 3 days in advance, a weather forecast is published; 1 day before, the relevant bureau identifies areas expected to be affected and narrows down the timeframe; 6 hours prior, high-risk areas are identified; 3 hours in advance, those areas are refined; and 1 hour before, a final warning names the streets likely to be affected.

The advantage of this approach is that it sets expectations. When the authorities receive the first warning, they know what is coming and can make necessary preparations. The system was used prior to heavy rain in June 2020. When the second warning was issued, the Shenzhen government published guidance on preparing for the rain and its effects. At the fourth warning, subway managers and other authorities put emergency plans into action. The fifth warning announced a citywide closure of schools. While flooding did occur, deaths were averted.

That case shows the importance of close cooperation between the meteorological authorities and government departments, to make sure warnings are given and acted on rapidly and effectively. In the China Meteorological Administration’s instructions for weather warnings, each level (blue, yellow, orange and red) comes with preparedness guidance. For example, in response to a red rain warning, the guidelines recommend “cancelling indoor and outdoor gatherings and closing schools and workplaces”.

But national-level guidelines aren’t enough. More detailed rules and advice are needed at the local level. At a seminar on climate change in the Pearl River Delta region, Du Yaodong, chief technical officer for the Guangdong Meteorological Bureau, explained that provincial emergency management rules published in 2010 specify that the meteorological authorities will publish weather warnings. Further rules in 2014 established that when a yellow, orange or red typhoon warning or a red rain warning is issued, schools should close and non-essential employees should adjust their working hours or go home.

Guangdong government departments work together to respond to extreme weather. The meteorological bureau has worked with the education and labour authorities to put in place automatic school closures when typhoons hit, with accompanying guidelines; and to write into all labour contracts clauses on workplace closures during high-level warnings. The bureau also worked with the transportation authorities on a weather warning response mechanism, and with subway managers to create a set of warnings specific to the subway.

From warnings to action: challenges ahead

The most challenging part of this process is turning warnings into action. The first obstacle is a lack of awareness about how extreme weather risks are increasing due to climate change. Reporting on the Zhengzhou floods showed that city residents hadn’t paid attention to the weather warnings and didn’t know what the precipitation figures signified. It is particularly easy for those who live in inland cities to assume they won’t see catastrophic rainfall and so ignore warnings.

But He Xin, director of environmental projects at the Guangdong Harmony Foundation, told China Dialogue that things are different in her province. “People in Guangdong are alert to typhoon and rain warnings and know how to protect their homes during a typhoon. But they are less likely to take note of warnings of high temperatures, even though heat is also dangerous. Some older people are reluctant to use air conditioning even when a warning is in effect, which can trigger cardiovascular problems and potentially result in deaths.”

We often say the public lack awareness, but actually officials and workers at the grassroots need better knowledge of climate risks — He Xin, director of environmental projects at the Guangdong Harmony Foundation

A lack of awareness of climate risks can mean emergency measures are taken less seriously. He Xin says that emergency response requirements are often treated lightly at the grassroots level.

“For example, under the guidelines, outdoor public spaces should have been closed during last year’s Tropical Storm Ma-on. Some places closed them for half a day, others for a full day or two days. What actually happened was often down to the individual choices of grassroots officials.” She adds: “We often say the public lack awareness, but actually officials and workers at the grassroots need better knowledge of climate risks. There’s a lot of work to be done educating people.”

Another challenge is the complexity of implementing cross-departmental adaptation measures. He Xin says: “Community adaptation measures are overseen by different departments. The meteorological authorities do weather warnings. Emergency management authorities handle floods. Illnesses arising from heatwaves are the responsibility of the disease control authorities.”

Guo Jiangwen, a senior research fellow at London thinktank Chatham House, emphasises the importance of joined-up action. Recognising that the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 2035 was coproduced by 17 government departments, she says: “Implementation at the local level must also be a process of cross-departmental joint action. Local capacity building by one department won’t be enough. Multiple bodies – environmental protection, emergency services, transport, health – all need to be involved.”

Specific policies are needed to refine national strategy into local action and crisis management. In September, and following on from the publication of the national strategy in June, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment published a guide to drafting provincial climate adaptation plans. It was designed to help provincial governments create action plans to tackle major issues within their jurisdictions. That process has not yet filtered down to the community level. Residents still need more specific policy guidance.

He Xin offers an example. After the floods in Zhengzhou, the local government ordered electricity distribution rooms be moved above ground to avoid flooding. That might sound simple, but it requires the relocation of electricity cables and neighbourhood committees can’t manage those changes to infrastructure. Without policy support, it can’t be done at the community level.

He Xin thinks a single government body should take the lead, organising and pushing forward with work. She explains that at the grassroots level, work is carried out by neighbourhood committees, village committees and “social work service stations”, which organise community activities. “It is easier to make progress in some communities than in others. For example, in some “urban villages”, populations can be very mixed and so cross-departmental coordination is needed to get things done. If one department can take the lead and manage the work, everyone will be better able to work together and solve problems.”

Preparedness should be based on an evaluation of climate risks. Some countries already have mature systems in place for evaluating those risks: the UK has published a Climate Change Risk Assessment every five years since 2012, according to a 2021 China–UK report. That assessment identifies potential risks climate change will cause to different regions of the UK and estimates their scale and severity. Those assessments then inform the UK’s National Adaptation Programmes. “Adaptation needs to be based on scientific risk assessments,” Guo Jiangwen says. “In China, we’re just starting to assess climate risks. But the task is being taken more seriously and the new National Strategy stresses its importance. In the future, climate risk assessments will inform spatial planning, urban zoning and planning for social and economic development as a whole.”

Can the 31631 model be applied nationwide?

A month after the July 2021 floods, Zhengzhou again saw heavy rainfall. This time, the city put the 31631 model into action, and the public security authorities, city managers, healthcare providers and emergency services worked together. Workplaces and schools closed and public transport shut down using a “full closure” approach.
While that worked, it will take time to see if the model can be successfully replicated across China. Guo Jiangwen warns that local circumstances need to be considered. Other cities can study the Guangdong model but should also adjust or innovate according to their own needs.

“Take sponge cities as an example. We can’t just replicate the trials already done, as there’s lots of room for improvements,” she says. “Different regions have different types of risks, at different severities. Adaptation and mitigation measures need to take the local infrastructure and resources into account.”

Climate change means that extreme weather events such as the Zhengzhou floods will become more frequent. Adaptation to that involves systemic change – from national strategies to urban climate resilience, to risk awareness and emergency responses at the community level.

“Currently, policy only looks at the provincial level. City and community level policy hasn’t caught up yet,” says He Xin. “Adaptation should be both a top-down and bottom-up process. We must combine information from both ends to ensure effective policy decisions.”

This article was originally published on China Dialogue under the Creative Commons BY NC ND licence.

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Xi’s speech to a large extent echoed his famous speech at Davos in 2017. Once again, he sought to portray China as a leading proponent of globalisation and anti-protectionism – passing over growing international concern about the recent statist trajectory of the Chinese economy. In addition, the Chinese leader made some eye-catching climate change-related pledges, setting a target for China to be carbon-neutral by 2060.

Trump, meanwhile, used his time to present a now-familiar litany of grievances towards China, chief among them its response to Covid-19; and he warned countries that they should take care of their own interests first, once more eschewing the US’s traditional role as the world’s leading force for global cooperation.

The following newsletter summarises the main points of the leaders’ speeches, with links to both at the end.

Xi defends globalisation and promises more aid to developing countries

Fight against Covid-19

Xi began his speech by highlighting the colossal challenges posed by the recent Covid-19 pandemic. He called for a multilateral effort to strengthen the leading role of the World Health Organisation and for better coordination of macroeconomic policies to help countries reopen their economies.

Furthermore, he called for the international community to address pressing issues such as debt relief, and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in developing countries.

Regarding the fight against Covid-19, Xi repeated China’s commitment to contribute US$2 billion (£1.6 billion) of international assistance over the next year and promised that any vaccine developed by China would be made available to all countries.

Fight against protectionism

Xi spoke in defence of globalisation, rejecting what he called zero-sum thinking and protectionist tendencies. In a thinly veiled criticism of the Trump administration, the Chinese leader said that “we should see each other as members of the same big family, pursue win-win cooperation, rise above ideological disputes, and not fall into the trap of ‘clash of civilisations’”.

Xi argued that globalisation is irreversible and that no country could thrive in isolation. He affirmed the central role of the World Trade Organisation and its multilateral trading regime. Yet Xi also acknowledged that the global governance system needs reform to deal with modern challenges such as Covid-19, and he promised to work with other nations to make the UN fit for the 21st century.

Fight against climate change

In the most headline-grabbing section of his address, Xi announced that China would step up its contribution to the global fight against climate change. Specifically, Xi said that China would aim to reverse its increase of CO2 emissions before 2030, and to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.

Xi also confirmed the targets outlined in the Paris Climate Agreement and called for a ‘green revolution’ and ‘green economic recovery’ from the pandemic.

China promises more development aid

Xi ended by announcing several concrete measures to support UN efforts to help developing countries in the current situation, including a pledge to contribute an additional US$50 million (£39 million) to the UN Covid-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan.

Trump praises himself and blames China for Covid-19

While Xi called for a multilateral effort to deal with the Covid-19 crisis, Donald Trump did the opposite.

Trump explicitly blamed China for the spread of Covid-19, which he again called the ‘China virus’. He called upon the world to hold China and the World Health Organisation – which according to Trump is under China’s control – accountable for the damage caused by the pandemic.

In a speech marked by his signature hyperbole, Trump – who is of course currently heavily in campaign mode – spent more time praising his own achievements than addressing his global audience.

While Xi promised US$2 billion to support countries in the fight against Covid-19, Trump highlighted the US$2.5 trillion in U.S. military spending undertaken by his administration, and its purported achievements in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

Whereas Xi addressed global poverty and climate change, Trump talked about terrorism, drug trafficking and the repression of women and religious minorities. Where Xi stressed China’s role as a promoter of global and sustainable development, Trump styled the United States as the world’s foremost champion of human rights. And whereas Xi finished his speech with specific proposals to support UN programmes, Trump concluded that each country should do what America has done under his leadership and look out for itself, in the following terms:

“For decades, the same tired voices proposed the same failed solutions, pursuing global ambitions at the expense of their own people. But only when you take care of your own citizens will you find a true basis for cooperation. As President, I have rejected the failed approaches of the past, and I am proudly putting America first, just as you should be putting your countries first. That’s okay — that’s what you should be doing.”

References

Full Speech of Xi Jinping

Full Speech of Donald Trump

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