The meeting, held at the Sheraton Grand Hotel in Rio de Janeiro, lasted approximately 20 minutes.

During this brief but significant engagement, Prime Minister Starmer emphasised the importance of a “strong UK-China relationship” for the benefit of both nations and the broader international community, calling for relations to be “consistent, durable, and respectful.”

“The UK will be a predictable, consistent, sovereign actor committed to the rule of law,” said PM Starmer. 

A UK government press release stated that Prime Minister Starmer underscored the need for China and the UK to collaborate in supporting global stability, fostering economic cooperation, and advancing the global clean energy transition. He underscored that much more must be done to achieve net zero, with both nations playing a vital role in this effort.

During the discussion, the Prime Minister proposed a visit to Beijing or London for a full bilateral meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang. He also suggested that Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves meet her counterpart, Minister He Lifeng, early in the new year to “explore more investment projects and a more level playing field to help our businesses.”

A readout from Xinhua quoted PM Starmer as noting that China and the UK share “extensive common interests” and “bear important responsibilities in solving global challenges and maintaining world peace and development.” The UK, he stated, seeks to deepen cooperation with China in areas such as “economy and trade, science and technology, finance, healthcare, education, and climate change.”

PM Starmer also raised sensitive issues, including human rights, Taiwan, parliamentary sanctions, and the case of Jimmy Lai.

Xinhua’s coverage highlighted President Xi’s comments to PM Starmer, in which he stressed that the UK and China have significant roles to play in advancing their respective nations while addressing global challenges. President Xi called for both nations to remain strategic partners, pursue open cooperation, and maintain healthy and stable relations.

Despite their differences, President Xi remarked that the UK and China have “broad space for cooperation” and should work together to “promote political solutions to pressing issues, strengthen global governance of artificial intelligence, and contribute to world economic growth and shared development among nations.”

UK-China relations have seen steady improvement since Labour’s rise to power in June. PM Starmer and President Xi had their first phone call in August, followed by Foreign Minister David Lammy’s visit to Beijing in October. During that trip, Lammy met with key Chinese political leaders, including Premier Li Qiang, and engaged with UK businesses, including the China-Britain Business Council.

Chancellor Reeves is scheduled to visit Beijing early next year to hold the first UK-China Economic and Financial Dialogue since 2019.

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In The Great Reversal, Brown’s intention is to provide British readers with our own China story and an understanding of how and why the West, through Britain, impacted and shaped the east in the form of China. Paul French caught up with Kerry Brown to talk Anglo-Chinese relations, the issue of our collective China knowledge (or lack of it) and what we can do about it.

Why do you think China and Chinese history have been so historically absent from our school curriculums, and why should we try and boost the study of China at the secondary school level?

British imperial history is extremely contentious, but the one impact it did have that no one could dispute is that Britain became involved, directly or indirectly, in a vast number of other countries and territories. That means that China has largely been seen as a subset of this broader history and tended to get subsumed into it. Things are complicated by the fact that the Chinese story was not straightforward. Apart from Hong Kong, ceded in different stages from 1842, China was part of what some historians have called an ‘informal’ empire and never directly governed. So that makes British involvement a more complex story to tell. Those are two of the more obvious reasons why even the relatively well-defined area of Britain’s relations with China and Chinese history are not easy to teach today and, therefore, largely neglected. On top of that is the obvious unfamiliarity with Chinese dynastic history, which is vast and largely unknown by the British.

On the other hand, Anglo-Chinese relations are widely taught in China, invariably accentuating the negative aspects of the shared histories. Presumably, this doesn’t help either.

Many Chinese people certainly have an understanding of there being a shared history between Britain and China. A lot of this is covered during the patriotic education curriculum introduced since the 1990s, reinforcing the sense that China was victimised and mistreated by colonial powers during the modern era. Of course, Britain figures amongst the most prominent. Much of this history can be contested – if people at least know some of the detail. But the fact is that from the early 19^th century, Britain enjoyed huge economic, military and technological advantages over China (and elsewhere) and exploited those. It did so opportunistically rather than through any intrinsic desire to bully or destroy. But in the end, the collective memories these actions inspired took deep roots amongst the Chinese. British people need to have at least a counter narrative that, while acknowledging some of these issues, at least paints a more complex and better-informed picture. That was one of the reasons why I wrote this history book.

Looking at Anglo-Chinese relations, you talk of a “great reversal”. What do you mean by that?

Britain and China have links going back at least to 1600. Over that four and a quarter centuries, on the whole, in terms of key areas like economic strength, military ability, technological and cultural power, and geopolitical influence, Britain was often stronger than China – particularly in the 19^th century onwards. Britain was the leading industrialising nation in the early modern era, giving it massive capacity in terms of naval technology and the ability to impact and influence China. China certainly had some influence on Britain, it’s true, through its aesthetics and the production of things Britain needed, like tea and porcelain. But the British China story till recently was one where in most areas, Britain enjoyed relative advantages. Since the 1980s, that situation has now reversed. In 2005, China’s economy overtook Britain’s. It is now about three times larger. China now has the largest navy in the world, at least in terms of vessels. In the area of technology, from artificial intelligence to quantum mechanics, it is pulling ahead of Britain. This has happened recently and quickly. That is the great trend of reversal I am referring to.

Do you think that our lack of a collective national understanding of Chinese and Anglo-Chinese history means we tend to demonise the PRC when it comes to trade disagreements, quota battles and more personal enmities, such as with Huawei?

I think the main issue that really struck me as I wrote the book was not so much that Britain demonised China. There had always been strands of Sinophobia and antagonism towards China way back in history, from the era of our first encounter as nations. There was plenty of pretty clear dislike of the British among Chinese, too. What was more striking was how little Britain ever really invested in making its mind up about what sort of place China was, and what sort of people the Chinese were. There seemed to be this deep ambiguity in British attitudes, veering from fascination on the one hand to something approaching apprehensive fear on the other – with no real attempt to create a consensus between these. That China today has a political system that is alien to Britain is obviously an issue – but I wonder whether some of the reactions to China we see now have, lurking behind them, these longer-standing confusions amongst ourselves and, of course, the lack of a really clear understanding of what we think China actually stands for and what kind of common ground we have with the place.

Do you think that this lack of understanding that your book seeks to address also means that Britain’s voice on key issues is less than it should be, as so many of our key decision-makers lack a grasp of the issues?

I think British politicians in recent years (and, of course, there have been exceptions) who deal with these issues often have attitudes towards China but very seldom real knowledge. There are plenty of things that Britain could and should hold China to account for. But the default has become more about stating standard lines of where Britain feels China is not acting properly, and feeling that just stating this is sufficient. I don’t think China looks down on Britain. But these days, I also don’t think it automatically believes Britain occupies some morally superior position. I think if British people understood their history with China more clearly, then they would be in a better place to work out how they can talk to China and how they can select issues that matter and which they need to debate and discuss with China. We might not believe we can understand China, but we can certainly understand our own long history with the place. That at least gives us a place to start from.

And finally, how can we improve our national consciousness of China? More space for China on the national curriculum? More university departments? More exchange visits?

The British story with China is a rich and fascinating one. British people should not find China unfamiliar. When they drink tea from porcelain cups and wear clothing made from silk, usually in gardens with plants and design features once inspired by China, they are all touching the parts of British life today that testify to the deep impact China has had on the way we live and who we are.  Britain also deeply influenced China in its modern development, in ways which were critically important. Just a recognition of this deep joint connection would help. Like I said just now, it might be a big ask to get people to delve into Chinese history and culture per se. But surely understanding British history with China should be more straightforward. And at least there is one relatively accessible book they can find that in now!

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What was the background that led to you writing the ‘Towards a UK strategy and policies for relations with China’ report?

Trade and investment are very important, but so too are national security and values (in the broadest sense, such as freedom of speech, academic freedom, democracy). In the long run, our economic interests will suffer if our security and values interests are compromised.

I have been outside the British government since 2011, apart from the last four months of 2017 when I was asked to go back to the embassy in China to cover the Party Congress. My impression was that by then it was finally dawning on people that the assumptions behind the ‘Golden Era’ were mistaken and a new set of policies were needed. Yet it did not appear to me, admittedly as an outsider, that in 2017/18 deep consideration was being given or commissioned towards a rethinking and resetting. So, in early 2018 I thought that I would help to stir things up, encouraged, I may say by one or two people within government.

In the long run, our economic interests will suffer if our security and values interests are compromised

Resettling in the UK after 15 years abroad – or perhaps my own lack of application – delayed the start but I eventually started a series of long papers and other articles, all of which aimed to set the scene and suggest ideas for government to think about. I started in Feb 2019 with a paper ‘China–UK Relations Where to Draw the Border Between Influence and Interference’, because that issue was especially urgent; next a joint paper ‘Rising to the China Challenge’, which looked at the need for government to establish a cross-departmental mechanism to coordinate China policy; then a paper explaining why China will not be a superpower ‘Foresight 2020: The Challenges Facing China’ (don’t get me wrong: China will certainly be important, but we should not believe the myths); and finally in June this year ‘Towards a UK strategy and policies for relations with China’.

For those who have not yet read the report, what does a new China strategy look like for the UK in your view?

The title of my paper starts with the word ‘Towards…’. I don’t profess to present a fully formed strategy, emerging like Athene fully armed from the head of Zeus. As I and co-authors at the Policy Institute at King’s College made clear in a January 2020 article ‘Rising to the China Challenge’, the first steps are to get the right government structures in place. China is an issue which faces just about every government department, not just the economic and security ministries. It is the only country which does, apart from the US, and our relations with the US are such that we can pick up the phone and talk to whoever. So a strategy and policies are needed which are consistent across government – the debacle over Huawei and the sacking of Gavin Williamson for the NSC leak on the ‘decision’ back in May 2019 was clear evidence of that.

A new strategy should prioritise the UK’s own national security, interests and values, while at the same time trying to ensure that we maximise good relations with China

So a new strategy should prioritise the UK’s own national security, interests and values, while at the same time trying to ensure that we maximise good relations with China. The world, and in particular Xi’s China, has changed. So, unfortunately, there will be costs, particularly in those areas where we must necessarily diverge from the CCP. But I don’t see those being nearly as big as some suggest.

In your report, you call for the UK Government to set a policy on Chinese participation in the UK’s critical national infrastructure by the end of 2020. How do you see this working in practice?

I do think that we shall need to exclude Chinese companies, which have to obey the Party whether they are SOEs or private, from certain areas. Telecoms is one. The grid is another, although it might be acceptable to have Chinese participation in energy generation up to perhaps 15% of the total.

The question of R&D cooperation is also a thorny one. Given the desire of the CCP to impose its wishes on other countries – recent pressure, not least over Covid-19 supplies or the attacks on Australia – it makes no sense to strengthen the military capabilities of a potentially hostile power. So universities and companies will need to be sure that they are not cooperating in areas of technology which have dual civilian and military use. The government will need to set up consultation mechanisms for this. UK companies will also need to look to their reputations.

A lot of attention has been drawn to the UK Government’s lack of Chinese language skills. As a former British diplomat who has worked extensively in or on China, what is your view on this?

It is not just the lack of language skills, but a broader lack of ‘China literacy’ which is the problem. China skills are at a premium and the government has to compete with business and other fields in a way in which it did not when I started out. So I think that the government must prioritise these skills in recruitment, promotion, and encouragement in other ways. It might also need to look at being more flexible in terms of bringing in China expertise at a more senior level with exchanges with business or academia (there are problems such as lower civil service salaries, and the expense and slowness of vetting, so imagination and determination will be needed). The government could also strengthen its consultation with those in academia, think tanks, businesses as it researches policy. Finally, it needs to encourage education to give greater prominence. A good start would be to help set up an A-level in Chinese Civilisation. That would encourage the young to be interested in China and to learn Mandarin.

What role do you see for British companies in helping to chart a successful course for UK-China relations?

I am not a businessman and it is, therefore, dangerous for me to pontificate on how business should operate. The political climate is going to get more difficult. But I always point out that in the past when the UK was in the doghouse over the PM meeting the Dalai Lama, or Norway over the award of the Nobel Prize to Liu Xiaobo, or South Korea or Australia – the list goes on – nevertheless the exports of all those countries in all those years increased. Sure, some companies’ interests were hit, usually, those whose products could easily be sourced elsewhere or were politically symbolic, but overall trade prospered.

I see no reason for trade and investment not to help build a solid relationship with China

This reinforces the belief that China needs the democratic world as much as the democratic world needs China. So as long as UK companies research their China market and produce things that China needs at a good price, then, the effects of Covid-19 permitting, I see no reason for trade and investment not to help build a solid relationship with China. I think that too often the press and government look at things through a political lens. But in the meantime business goes on, because it is in both sides’ interests. Business is the cake; ministerial visits, political agreements and so on, are the icing.

 It is vital to present a united front with the EU and other liberal democracies

Quite apart from political disagreements, the most important point for businesses is the achievement of a ‘level playing field’. The argument for further and timely opening in China is important. Progress will be resisted: who, given the choice would not want an unlevel playing field – in their favour? That means that whatever your views on Brexit, it is vital to present a united front (to coin a phrase) with the EU and other liberal democracies. Finally, we should not get too hung up by a Free Trade Agreement. We should aim for one, but one that promotes a level playing field. Australia took 10 years to negotiate one and then for political reasons signed something which is far from ideal. For sure, we want an FTA, but we want a good one. And in the absence of that trade will go on.

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The four publications approach our bilateral ties from different angles and together offer an overview of the choices and trade-offs that will determine the UK’s future approach:

• ‘Towards a UK strategy and policies for relations with China’ by Charles Parton, a former diplomat and senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), in collaboration with the Policy Institute at King’s College, London. The report argues that the UK urgently needs to develop a new China strategy.
• ‘After the Golden Age: Resetting UK-China Engagement’ by Sophia Gaston of the British Foreign Policy Group and Rana Mitter of the Oxford University China Centre. They argue for a better understanding of China’s complex development and foreign policy and call for a more pragmatic UK approach.
• ‘China and the United Kingdom: Economic Relationships’ by Bill Allen and his colleagues at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) highlights the importance of China for the UK economy. Allen and his co-authors argue that ignoring China or even cutting our trade relations would entail serious economic trade-offs.
• ‘UK jobs dependent on links to China’ by Cambridge Econometrics (CE) takes an in-depth look at the positive role played by China-related trade, investment, tourism and educational programmes in creating and safeguarding British jobs. The report, which was commissioned by CBBC, finds that nearly 150,000 jobs in the UK rely on UK-China bilateral trade and other Chinese expenditure in this country.

Security and zero-sum thinking

Education and understanding

Economy and business

CBBC View

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Overseeing the Department for International Trade’s China arm, John Edwards has been busy in recent weeks managing the logistics of purchasing and transporting large volumes of medical supplies from China to the UK. But as the need for such emergency interventions levels off, Edwards says that DIT China will be focusing on three primary areas. First, updating its digital offering to facilitate future bilateral trade and related events. Second, engaging in more government-to-government work and cementing its transformation from trade promotion body to market access body. Third, becoming more active and visible in demonstrating that the China market is open and ready for business.

Edwards acknowledges the increasingly complex political environment that has developed in the wake of the pandemic, but notes that the UK government remains ambitious in its plans to develop the UK’s trade and investment relationship with China. “If you are talking geopolitically and strategically, then there are transformational benefits for ongoing and deepening ties of commerce and economy between China and the rest of the world and between China and the UK,” he says.

Whilst trade has been negatively affected by the pandemic, the UK’s exports to China as a proportion of its total global exports have increased over the last four months, and recent years have seen Chinese investors looking outside of London to areas that do not traditionally attract investment such as Hull, Mansfield, and Bolton.

On the topic of recent geopolitical tensions and the increase of negative rhetoric towards China, Edwards acknowledges that disagreements between the UK and China – both at the government level and between businesses – are natural. However, he emphasises that both China and the UK are aware of the benefits of their ongoing cooperation, even if differences in opinion may arise, and highlights that the UK government does not oppose the rise of China.

“There’s a recognition on the UK side that we have to be driven by our national interest and have a distinctive UK policy, and I think there’s recognition on the Chinese side that they should not see the UK as a proxy for other governments,” says Edwards, urging businesses and stakeholders to look past the most extreme voices and focus on the government’s top-level stance on China.

There are transformational benefits for ongoing and deepening ties of commerce and economy between China and the rest of the world and between China and the UK

Edwards emphasises that although China has not been named as a priority target for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) following Brexit, the UK government has an ambitious agenda for the relationship.

“There can be no global economic recovery without China, and indeed there can be no UK global ambition post-Brexit without China,” he says. He emphasises that although an FTA is not immediately forthcoming, the government’s ongoing work to improve UK businesses’ access to the China market through regulatory reform and market access initiatives has the potential to open up billions of pounds worth of trade.

Although market access and China’s regulatory environment remain a challenge for UK businesses, Edwards highlights some positive developments such as the introduction of equity caps for joint ventures and real improvements in the implementation and enforcement of intellectual property. That being said, Edwards is aware that there is much still to be done to further open up the China market. “What we hear all the time from British businesses here is that while central government policies are moving in the right direction, there’s still a time lag or a gap or an unwillingness for that to be implemented at the provincial and sub-provincial level,” he notes.

Edwards expresses cautious optimism for China’s economic recovery following Covid-19, and highlights several key areas of opportunity for UK-China trade. He predicts particular demand for the UK’s creative technology, edtech and fintech, and ongoing cooperation in the trade of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment. In particular, Edwards highlights food and drink as the fastest growing sector for UK exports to China, thanks to the aggregate impact of many SMEs operating in this field. Beer exports, he notes, have been growing at over 100 % a year.

Finally, referencing his own background working on environmental issues, Edwards highlights his commitment to engaging China on climate change, noting that China has already contributed to this endeavour. He predicts close cooperation between the UK and China on this issue moving forward in areas such as offshore wind consultancy, and notes that DIT has dedicated teams working to develop the UK’s capacity in areas such as green finance.

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Britain is in the grip of some serious soul-searching over its relationship with China.

The coronavirus crisis has seen numerous appeals for us to “get real” about our approach towards the world’s second-largest economy. Most of these clarion calls have taken a similar form: a litany of grievances against the Chinese, capped by vague demands for Boris Johnson to take a tougher line with Beijing.

Playing the blame game might feel good, but it would be no substitute for a serious and thought-through strategy.

“Getting real” in the case of China means understanding that the UK already has important economic ties, which we can ill afford to put at risk. It also means recognising that the relationship gives us influence and a platform from which to pursue our broader goals. We need a load-bearing relationship that allows us to work with China on shared endeavours, such as combating climate change and future pandemics, and to challenge its government where we disagree – particularly on rule of law issues.

China already plays a central role in Britain’s economy. It is the third largest export market for British goods, with items worth £25.8bn sold there last year. That is more than 7 percent of our total shipments, and over double what we sold to China in 2012.

British service sector firms are forging ahead too, and running an ever-expanding surplus with China. Opportunities for British banks, schools and healthcare providers will continue to grow as it opens up further.

The tens of thousands of Chinese studying here provide vital revenue for our universities, while tourism from China was growing quickly pre-pandemic. Britain’s appeal to Chinese consumers is broad – Peppa Pig is a phenomenon among children, while football fans closely follow the Premier League. The likes of the British Museum and the Royal Shakespeare Company have enjoyed great success in China over the past few years.

Because of this export success, our sizeable trade deficit with China is shrinking. British companies from AstraZeneca to Burberry to Rolls-Royce have thrived on Chinese demand.

The pandemic’s impact will undoubtedly slow trade growth this year. Yet China’s economy has started recovering and its longer-term growth potential is huge as its middle class becomes wealthier.

For this very reason, China-Britain Business Council members remain committed to the market beyond the current difficult period. We should also be proud of our record in attracting Chinese capital.

Since 2000, the UK has received over £44bn of Chinese investment – more than twice as much as Germany, the second biggest recipient in Europe.

Scaremongers warn of China stealing British expertise, but more often such investment has helped to create or preserve British jobs. Jingye’s purchase of British Steel, helping to save 3,000 jobs, is a case in point.

A government looking to invest in the UK’s infrastructure renewal can ill afford to spurn China’s expertise – but that is what it will effectively do if, under pressure from the Sinophobes, the Government reverses its decision to allow Huawei’s limited involvement in building out Britain’s 5G network.

The desire to put our national foot down with China is perhaps understandable given this year’s events. But it is demonstrably neither in our own interest, nor in the interests of others whom we might seek to protect. Hectoring impotently from the sidelines will not persuade the Chinese to change their approach and may do considerable damage.

These are dangerous times for the global system. Yes, the UK must learn lessons about supply chain security. But to disengage with China just because globalisation has failed to turn that ancient nation into a liberal democracy would be folly.

Much of the analysis ignores the benefits to Britain from China’s rise: not just cheaper goods for our consumers and a vast new market for our companies, but a route in to win over 1.3 billion hearts and minds to our values and way of life. If we walk away from China now our competitors will happily move in, pocketing the gains in jobs and in soft power.

After this pandemic subsides, and this crisis is over, China will matter more than ever for the future of our planet. Turning our backs now and walking off the field might bring momentary gratification but it would not be statesmanship. It would be an emotional spasm, and an egregious abdication of our patriotic duty to stand up for British jobs and British values.

If we want to have any influence on how the next superpower uses its huge economic and political weight, clear-eyed engagement – in our own hard-nosed interest – is the only answer for Global Britain.

James Sassoon served as the UK’s first commercial secretary to the Treasury from 2010 to 2013. He was chairman of the China-Britain Business Council from 2013 to 2019 and has been president of the council since 2019. He sits as a Conservative peer in the House of Lords. This article was first published in the Daily Telegraph on June 8, 2020. 

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