Wood’s BBC TV series saw him embark on a great historical adventure, exploring the stories, people and landscapes that created China’s distinctive character and genius over four thousand years. His most recent documentary on Du Fu: China’s Greatest Poet attracted praise in both the UK and China. Now he’s turned the documentary into a book ‘The Story of China: A Portrait of a Civilisation and its People’ (Simon & Schuster), which will be published this month.

Many people will have seen and enjoyed your BBC series The Story of China. Now we have the book – how long has this project been in the making for you?

I’ve been fascinated by China ever since I was at school. I travelled there first in the early eighties and filmed there first in 1990. The BBC series took three years of preparation, shooting and editing. Since then I’ve been working on the book and I’ve been back on various trips, making films about Deng’s Reform and Opening Up 40 years ago, which was fantastically useful to help me think about that era and its colossal impact on China and the world. Then last autumn we shot a film on China’s greatest poet, Du Fu, for the BBC. The huge response in China reinforced my sense of the continuing importance of traditional culture and values among so many people in China.

The huge response in China reinforced my sense of the continuing importance of traditional culture and values among so many people in China

At the start of the book, you ask some big questions, such as ‘does the past still influence China’s present?’ We know that China’s leaders often reference the past, but in a country where most people are focused on simply getting ahead, does the influence of history go any deeper than soundbites used for during trade spats or diplomatic rows?

The return of traditional culture and religion is big in China today and the ‘Greatness of Chinese Civilisation’ is one of three pillars of Xi’s China Dream. In part this is government-sponsored, but in part it comes from the grassroots up.  As I describe in the book, the revival of customs, traditions, rituals, temple fairs, pilgrimages, the return of religion are visible everywhere today. In the book, there’s an amazing shot of part of a million-strong crowd at a shrine to the goddess Nüwa at a farmers’ festival in Henan. The people love their past: internal tourism is massive in China – six billion journeys in 2019.

But the past is also there in the state itself. As the dust settled after 1949, Western historians were struck by how uncannily the Party had replicated the bureaucratic despotism of the imperial period – at the top the figure of the Great Leader, the ‘Sage Monarch’ – of which the cult of Mao was a supreme example. Deng Xiaoping was anxious to rid China of what he saw as this ‘feudal’ relic and he put a limit on the term of office, but now the cult is back with Xi.

Wood’s hit BBC documentary has been turned into a book

How do you think China’s long history will continue to influence China’s development? Does a more economically powerful China not mean history becomes less important? That old grudges and antagonisms recede?

As people, the Chinese in many ways still think like Confucians; as a state, China is still an authoritarian bureaucracy as it was before 1911. The question now is when and how it will move to the rule of law? Short term may not look good but medium to long surely this must happen? Which is why continued engagement is so important.

Throughout its history, China has, in many different ways, dealt with almost constant outbreaks of disease and epidemics. Responses have ranged from denial (such as the cerebrospinal meningitis epidemic in the 1960s) to international collaboration to solve the problem (such as the pneumonic plague in northern China in 1910). How does China’s reaction to Covid-19 fit into a history of epidemic responses?

The Party acted according to its DNA: initial denial and cover-up at a local and then central level, then they were shocked by the rage of the people. News of the death of Dr Li Wenliang in Wuhan had 1.5 billion hits on the Weibo platform in 24 hours. But then the centralised government responded in a big way and seemingly successfully. In general, the Chinese government in this new assertive ‘Wolf Warrior’ phase is caught between their DNA as a Leninist organisation and the internationalism to which they also aspire – and without which we are all sunk?

China’s history is clearly one broken into chapters of rising and falling dynasties. Are there any common factors that lead to the demise of one dynasty, or system, in favour of another?

In the West, it’s been said, history is the story of the rise and decline of many different civilisations; in China history is a cycle of the rise and decline, and then rise again, of one civilisation. China broke apart many times, and there was no guarantee that it would be reunited – China could have ended up like Europe, with many states. But the sense of unity among intellectuals and the governing classes proved stronger. Generally, the demise of a dynasty came with the failure of governance, justice, and the ability to maintain order and protect and feed the people. Hence the central myth of rulership in ancient China: the Mandate of Heaven.

If the government is good the Mandate is prolonged, if virtue is lost then the Mandate is seen to have been withdrawn. That’s a metaphor of course, but nonetheless a useful one. And if the CCP is yet another dynasty, the moot question is whether they can still hold the Mandate, or whether corruption, the failure of the rule of law, the attacks on freedom, stack up in the eyes of the people – even though most people just want to get on with life and broadly have been prepared to go with the project for the last 40 years, so long as it delivers growth, stability and security. The Party just celebrated its centenary and has set its eyes on 2049. If they get to that you’d say the dynasty is established. But will they?

You cite a remarkable British Naval Intelligence account of China’s future written around the time of the Second World War, the Civil War, and its aftermath. In the report, the authors chose to highlight not disorder or authoritarianism, but the deep enduring characteristics of the Chinese world view. What were these and do you think they still stand?

It’s a fascinating text produced during the Japanese invasion, a time of violence and war when the breakup of the country seemed possible. And yet it stresses the deep resilience of China, its cultural resources, the core sense of justice and fairness handed down from the ancient philosophers, and the future role of the educated middle classes and intelligentsia. They saw a country of amazing potential… ‘a new and even greater China’.  Of course, they could not have foreseen what lay ahead. You might think those dreams were defeated after 1949. But the intelligentsia is still there: well-read, highly-educated, internationalist in their perspectives, but still passionately committed to the traditional culture.

The authors of the 1944 report understood that Chinese civilisation was essentially a moral order

The key thing was that the authors of the 1944 report understood that Chinese civilisation was essentially a moral order. Mao of course deliberately wanted to break allegiance to that past but he didn’t succeed. When today critics inside the Party criticise it for being a ‘zombie’ party, they mean it has no moral centre. When the powerful Central Commission for Discipline (who run the anti-corruption campaign) discussed our Du Fu film recently online, asking why it had affected people so much, they pinpointed values.

The admitted the anti-corruption campaign had failed because the Party cadres had not internalised the key Confucian values of virtue, benevolence, kindness and public spiritedness, that Du Fu showed. But Du Fu was also, of course, a critic of state incompetence and corruption and his words have lost none of their power and relevance. As many great thinkers in Chinese history would have agreed, free speech and the rule of law are the first essential steps.

The Story of China: A Portrait of a Civilisation and Its People (Simon & Schuster), is published this September.

The post Following his BBC documentary, Michael Wood discusses his new book appeared first on Focus - China Britain Business Council.

Juan Du is Associate Dean of the Faculty of Architecture at the University of Hong Kong (HKU) and a founding director of the Shenzhen Centre for Design. Her new book ‘The Shenzhen Experiment: The Story of China’s Instant City’ (Harvard University Press) emerged from her active involvement in the ongoing development and planning of the city.

It’s a study of a city planned to foster innovation, business and co-operation, as well as a new home for millions of migrant workers and their families from across the country.

Juan Du asks whether Shenzhen is the blueprint for a modern Chinese city, and what lessons have been learned since Deng Xiaoping supported the opening up of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ).

Paul French caught up with Juan Du on her commute between Hong Kong and Shenzhen.

PF: You’ve long shuttled between Beijing and Hong Kong but what first attracted you to Shenzhen?

JD: I was based in Beijing when I first started travelling to Shenzhen to work on the First Shenzhen Biennale of Architecture/Urbanism in 2005. Shenzhen’s so-called ‘villages within the city’ quickly caught my attention. Their unique street culture, diverse architectural and urban form, as well as the way people lived and inhabited the public spaces, were in such a stark contrast to the rest of the city.

These neighbourhoods struck me as being quite opposite to the outward image of Shenzhen – an overnight instant city without a history or culture of its own.

Shenzhen was certainly not a small fishing village, at least not during its past millennium of history.

I moved to the US in early 2006 to teach at MIT. However, my mind kept returning to China, and especially to Shenzhen. So I decided to accept an offer to teach at HKU and one motivation behind this move was Hong Kong’s proximity to Shenzhen.

Over the next 14 years, I worked with various communities in both cities. The initial fascination of Shenzhen’s urban villages gradually developed into a more comprehensive understanding of the overall city and the surrounding region.

PF: You challenge the idea of Shenzhen as a ‘blank canvas’ where nothing much existed before. What was Shenzhen, before it was Shenzhen? 

JD: While it has gone through many reincarnations throughout the past centuries, Shenzhen was certainly not a small fishing village, at least not during its past millennium of history.

Just prior to the designation as the City of Shenzhen in 1979, the approximately 2,000 square kilometres of land was known as Bao’an County, with a population of around 300,000 distributed across 2,000 villages, as well as small townships.

From serving as an important salt-production and administrative capital during the Han Dynasty to that of a major port on the South China Sea’s ancient maritime Silk Road, the area’s history was no less remarkable before it became Shenzhen.

During the more recent history, Bao’an County’s agricultural and aquacultural productions, such as lychees and oysters, were important exports in the 1950s.

From long-established agricultural, fishery, and sea-faring activities, to the industrial, commercial, and cultural enterprises of the past century, the existence of a productive population with deep connections to an extensive regional and international network absolutely impacted Shenzhen’s urbanisation into the city as we know it today.

PF: You talk about the ‘villages within the city’ – can you explain what these are and whether they are likely to survive?

JD: The ‘villages within the city,’ or ‘urban villages,’ are densely populated neighbourhoods where indigenous villagers built and own most of the properties. During the first decade of Shenzhen’s urbanisation, in order to meet the demands of a massive population of migrant workers seeking housing in the city, the villagers tore down their two-story houses and built up four- to eight-story tall mid-rise housing. These rentals gave the villagers sources of income and provided homes to the millions of migrants in the city.

There are approximately 300 urban villages in Shenzhen today. Collectively, they house around 10 million residents – about half the city’s total population. While the municipality has made efforts to demolish and redevelop urban villages, the population was too large and negotiations on property rights so complex and expensive, that only a handful of urban villages have been demolished and rebuilt.

In more recent years, Shenzhen has recognised the importance of these neighbourhoods as providers of affordable housing to the city’s working population, and the current urban planning policy is indicating a different approach – one of rehabilitation rather than total redevelopment.  Over the next decade, while the socio-economic characteristics will continue to change and evolve, I believe most of the urban villages in Shenzhen will remain.

PF: Shenzhen was so important to the early decades of Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening Up movement, but now with so many cities being designated Special Economic Zone (SEZ), what, if anything, remains unique and important about Shenzhen?

JD: There have been hundreds of SEZ’s and new areas established in China since the 1980s, but not even one comes close to Shenzhen. This has not deterred more ongoing efforts of economic or industrial zone developments in China. Viewing Shenzhen’s role as an industrial or economic zone only would be a mistake for anyone wishing to understand or emulate its development.

Shenzhen started as a SEZ, and it quickly evolved into a complex and multidimensional city. While various pioneering commercial activities in the industrial zones of Shenzhen contributed to its unique development, this city of 20 million offers important lessons not only on economic or urban development, but also on the cultural and social importance of cities in general.

At the time of researching and writing my book, I found that the most unique aspects of Shenzhen are often contrary to the current model of industrial zone development, such as the role of the local indigenous population, the collective economic power of SMEs, as well as the importance of affordable housing for migrants.

PF: Many foreign companies with investments and factories in Shenzhen say it is the newness of the city – not just the buildings and infrastructure, but also that nobody has traditional ties to the city – that makes it a good place to do business. You butt up against far fewer social and cultural problems than you might elsewhere. Do you think this is true, even now after four decades of Shenzhen?

JD: I understand the sentiment. This newness of the city and lack of traditional ties is reflective of Shenzhen as a migrant city – from the government to the factory managers.  Everyone is in Shenzhen because he or she made a choice to leave their hometown to come to a new city. This motivational quality is one of the most overlooked unique aspects of the city.

In addition, Shenzhen was the first city in China to break the mould of state-owned enterprises with tenured employment. Not only was the city new to the arriving population, but the rules of work were also new.

PF: Shenzhen – an interesting experiment or a model city of the future?

JD: Shenzhen is an experimental city that can provide many valuable lessons for future cities.  However it is not a model city in the ways in which it has been generalised – that of central planning, government control, foreign direct investment, etc.

Shenzhen was not only China’s tentative test of a market economy, rather it was a critical experiment. The city was a site of cultural, social and political experimentations that were directly opposite to the way the rest of the country existed in the 80s and 90s.  I hope Shenzhen continues to be a critical experiment for China and the rest of the world.

The post Architect Juan Du discusses Shenzhen’s migrant dwellers, city planning, and urban villages with Paul French appeared first on Focus - China Britain Business Council.